Hilary Putnam Biography Quotes 2 Report mistakes
| 2 Quotes | |
| Born as | Hilary Whitehall Putnam |
| Occup. | Philosopher |
| From | USA |
| Born | July 31, 1926 Chicago, Illinois, U.S. |
| Age | 99 years |
Hilary Whitehall Putnam was born in Chicago in 1926 and became one of the most influential American philosophers of the twentieth century. His father, Samuel Putnam, was a noted translator and writer, and the home he grew up in exposed him early to literature, languages, and political debate. Putnam studied mathematics and philosophy as an undergraduate at the University of Pennsylvania, and then pursued graduate work in philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles. At UCLA he worked with Hans Reichenbach, the prominent philosopher of science and leading figure of logical empiricism, shaping Putnam's early orientation toward logic, probability, and the philosophy of science.
Mathematics, Logic, and Computer Science
Putnam's early career straddled the boundary between mathematics, logic, and philosophy. He made foundational contributions to computability theory and automated reasoning. With Martin Davis he devised what became known as the Davis-Putnam procedure for satisfiability, and shortly thereafter Davis, George Logemann, and Donald Loveland developed the DPLL algorithm, a refinement with lasting impact on logic and computer science. Putnam also collaborated with Davis and Julia Robinson in work that led to the negative solution of Hilbert's Tenth Problem; this program culminated in Yuri Matiyasevich's proof that no algorithm can decide Diophantine equations. These results complemented Putnam's philosophical interest in the limits of formal methods and the nature of mathematical truth.
Academic Appointments and Colleagues
Putnam taught at several major universities before spending the bulk of his career at Harvard University, where he helped shape the philosophy department for decades. At Harvard he interacted with figures such as W. V. O. Quine, Nelson Goodman, John Rawls, and Burton Dreben, and his work was in dialogue with logicians and philosophers including Saul Kripke, Alfred Tarski, Michael Dummett, and Noam Chomsky. These interlocutors influenced the questions he pursued, even when he sharply disagreed with them, and he in turn influenced a wide circle of students, philosophers, and computer scientists.
Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science
In the 1960s Putnam advanced functionalism in the philosophy of mind, arguing that mental states are defined by their causal roles rather than by a specific physical substrate. His celebrated multiple realizability argument held that creatures with very different physical makeups could share the same mental states if they played the same functional roles. This view challenged both behaviorism and strict brain-state identity theories. Putnam later qualified and revised aspects of functionalism, repeatedly emphasizing that philosophical theories should track scientific and everyday practice rather than impose rigid metaphysical templates.
Philosophy of Language and Meaning
Putnam's name is inseparable from semantic externalism, developed through thought experiments that reshaped debates about reference and content. His Twin Earth scenario and the idea of a division of linguistic labor illustrated that meanings are not determined solely by what is "in the head", but also by relations to the external world and to expert communities. These arguments engaged with and sometimes challenged contemporaries such as Kripke and were grounded in broader insights from logic and model theory. Putnam's work on reference, natural-kind terms, and indexicals became standard points of departure in late twentieth-century philosophy of language.
Realism, Science, and the Model-Theoretic Argument
Putnam was a relentless re-examiner of realism. After early sympathy for a robust metaphysical realism, he developed the model-theoretic argument and the brain-in-a-vat critique to show that the relation between theory and world could not be captured by a purely correspondence-based picture insulated from epistemic norms. In Reason, Truth and History he defended "internal realism", the view that truth and reference are constrained by idealized rational acceptability within conceptual schemes. In later years he moved toward a more direct or commonsense realism, insisting that our successful practices in science and ordinary life already exhibit our contact with an independent world. This trajectory displays his characteristic willingness to revise his own positions in response to objections and to insights from science and logic.
Ethics, Pragmatism, and the Entanglement of Fact and Value
Drawing on the American pragmatists Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, as well as on Wittgenstein's later philosophy, Putnam argued that values are not detachable add-ons to a neutral description of the world. He criticized the fact/value dichotomy and showed how evaluative judgments are woven into inquiry and justification, including in the sciences. This line of thought supported his broader commitment to a humanly situated realism: our normative vocabularies and practices are neither illusions nor reducible to brute facts, but integral to how we come to know and act.
Public Engagement and Personal Life
Putnam's public life reflected a sense of responsibility consonant with his philosophical views. During the Vietnam era he was active in campus politics and antiwar movements, later distancing himself from more radical affiliations while maintaining a lifelong concern for justice and democratic practices. He married the philosopher Ruth Anna Putnam, a close intellectual companion who shared his interest in pragmatism and ethics; their discussions and co-teaching helped shape his evolving arguments about value, realism, and the aims of philosophy.
Legacy
Hilary Putnam died in 2016 in Massachusetts, leaving an unusually broad legacy that reaches across analytic philosophy, logic, mathematics, and computer science. He exemplified philosophical fallibilism in practice: he did not hesitate to rethink his own views, and he welcomed pointed criticism as a route to clarity. His collaborations with Martin Davis, Julia Robinson, George Logemann, and Donald Loveland changed the landscape of automated reasoning; his exchanges with Quine, Kripke, Goodman, Rawls, Chomsky, Dummett, and others reshaped central debates; and his writings on mind, language, realism, and value continue to anchor curricula and research. Putnam's work remains a model of rigor joined to a humane conception of inquiry, in which philosophy is continuous with science and responsive to the complexities of lived experience.
Our collection contains 2 quotes who is written by Hilary, under the main topics: Truth - Reason & Logic.
Other people realated to Hilary: Cornel West (Educator), Robert Nozick (Philosopher), Willard Van Orman Quine (Philosopher)
Hilary Putnam Famous Works
- 2004 Ethics without Ontology (Book)
- 2002 The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (Book)
- 1999 The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (Book)
- 1983 Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers Volume 3 (Book)
- 1981 Reason, Truth and History (Book)
- 1979 Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Mathematics, Matter and Method (Book)
- 1978 Meaning and the Moral Sciences (Book)
- 1975 Mathematics, Matter and Method (Book)
- 1975 Philosophical Papers: Volume 2, Mind, Language and Reality (Book)
- 1971 Philosophy of Logic (Book)
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