Peter Frederick Strawson Biography Quotes 2 Report mistakes
| 2 Quotes | |
| Occup. | Philosopher |
| From | United Kingdom |
| Born | November 23, 1919 Ealing, London, England |
| Died | February 13, 2006 Oxford, England |
| Aged | 86 years |
Peter Frederick Strawson was born in 1919 in the United Kingdom and became one of the most influential British philosophers of the twentieth century. He read philosophy at Oxford, where he absorbed a tradition that combined rigorous analysis with a sensitive attention to language, argument, and the historical canon. His early promise as a thinker emerged in seminar rooms animated by the postwar revival of analytic philosophy, where he learned to balance respect for formal logic with a close reading of ordinary speech and classical texts.
Oxford and the Ordinary Language Movement
Strawson spent virtually his entire professional life at Oxford. He taught there for decades, first as a college fellow and tutor and later in a senior chair, shaping generations of students. He worked alongside J. L. Austin and H. P. Grice, central figures in the ordinary language movement. With Austin, he shared the conviction that philosophical puzzles often dissolve when we carefully examine how words are used; with Grice, he pursued the subtleties of meaning, implicature, and communication. Gilbert Ryle was an influential presence in Oxford philosophy during Strawson's early career, and Strawson later held the Waynflete Professorship of Metaphysical Philosophy, a position that had been associated with Ryle's era-defining leadership. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy and was eventually knighted, becoming widely known as Sir Peter Strawson.
Reference, Presupposition, and Early Logic
Strawson's first major splash came with the 1950 essay On Referring, which challenged Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions. Where Russell analyzed definite descriptions as quantificational devices that could be plainly true or false, Strawson argued that many apparent assertions carry presuppositions: if those presuppositions fail, we should not count the speech act as either true or false. This insight inaugurated a rich tradition in the philosophy of language and semantics, shaping later debates about truth-value gaps, presupposition triggers, and the pragmatics of assertion. His book Introduction to Logical Theory provided a lucid survey of classical logic while arguing that the analysis of meaning cannot be captured by formal calculus alone. Strawson did not reject logical rigor; rather, he insisted that logic be guided by the ways speakers actually use language.
This period also saw his collaboration with H. P. Grice in In Defence of a Dogma, a response to W. V. Quine's challenge to the analytic-synthetic distinction. Strawson and Grice contended that Quine's critique did not eliminate the nuanced roles that analyticity and synonymy play in linguistic practice, a debate that shaped mid-century analytic philosophy.
Individuals and Descriptive Metaphysics
Strawson's 1959 book Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics transformed metaphysics by reviving questions many analytic philosophers had sidelined. He introduced the contrast between descriptive metaphysics, which aims to map the actual conceptual structure we use to think about the world, and revisionary metaphysics, which seeks to replace it. He defended the primacy of "basic particulars" within a spatiotemporal framework and developed a sophisticated account of persons as entities that are both physical and psychological subjects of predication. Individuals gave fresh life to issues of identity, subjectivity, and the conceptual conditions for objective thought, influencing students and readers far beyond Oxford.
Kant and The Bounds of Sense
Strawson's historical engagement reached its apex in The Bounds of Sense (1966), a searching interpretation of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. He argued that core elements of Kant's transcendental project, especially the idea that objective experience requires a structured framework of concepts and intuition, could be preserved without Kant's full transcendental idealism. This approach guided Anglophone readers toward a selective but powerful Kantianism, and it sparked fruitful exchanges with contemporaries such as Michael Dummett on meaning and realism and with later critics who questioned how much of Kant survives Strawson's reconstruction.
Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and the Person
In Freedom and Resentment (1962) Strawson reframed the free will debate by focusing on our "reactive attitudes" such as resentment, gratitude, and forgiveness. Rather than grounding responsibility in metaphysical theses about determinism, he held that it is embedded in human practices and interpersonal relations. The essay profoundly influenced later work on moral responsibility, inspiring discussions by philosophers who, even when they disagreed, treated Strawson's framework as a starting point. His continued interest in the person and in our basic conceptual scheme connected this essay with the themes of Individuals, forging a distinctive unity across his ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind.
Language, Grammar, and Later Writings
Strawson's later work included Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar, where he pursued the relations between logical form and grammatical structure; Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, which opposed global skepticism by appealing to our entrenched conceptual practices; and Analysis and Metaphysics, a concise restatement of his mature views. He remained a patient critic of theories that, in his view, outran the stable contours of our actual conceptual repertoire. Debates about reference that he helped launch were later reshaped by Keith Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of descriptions and by Saul Kripke's causal theory of reference. Even as these developments modified the terrain, they credited Strawson for setting the questions in sharp relief.
Teaching, Students, and Intellectual Milieu
At Oxford, Strawson taught and mentored an extraordinary cohort. David Wiggins and Gareth Evans were among the most prominent philosophers who developed under his influence, taking forward questions about identity, meaning, and objectivity with a style deeply marked by Strawson's clarity and breadth. His son, the philosopher Galen Strawson, carried forward a family conversation about mind, self, and responsibility, often returning to themes first articulated in Freedom and Resentment. The corridor conversations and seminars that included J. L. Austin, H. P. Grice, Gilbert Ryle, and Michael Dummett formed a distinctive intellectual milieu: combative yet scrupulous, historically informed yet exacting about argument.
Honors, Later Life, and Legacy
Strawson served Oxford for decades, ultimately occupying the Waynflete Professorship of Metaphysical Philosophy and retiring after a long period of departmental leadership. Recognition came from within and beyond the academy: election to the British Academy, visiting lectureships abroad, and a knighthood that acknowledged the cultural significance of his work. He died in 2006, leaving a body of writing that remains central to contemporary debates.
Strawson's legacy rests on a unifying vision: philosophy should describe the structure of our thought and discourse with honesty and precision. He insisted that the analysis of language illuminates, rather than replaces, traditional metaphysical and epistemological questions. His challenges to Bertrand Russell clarified the nature of reference and presupposition; his exchanges with W. V. Quine crystallized what was at stake in analyticity; his reconstruction of Immanuel Kant revived transcendental arguments for a new era; and his account of reactive attitudes reframed responsibility as a human practice. Through his students, colleagues, and critics, including David Wiggins, Gareth Evans, J. L. Austin, H. P. Grice, Michael Dummett, Keith Donnellan, and Saul Kripke, his ideas continue to evolve. Yet the characteristic Strawsonian outlook endures: sober, humane, and rigorously attentive to how our conceptual scheme makes the world available to thought.
Our collection contains 2 quotes who is written by Peter, under the main topics: Reason & Logic.