"A movement that we will to execute is never more than a represented movement, and appears in a different domain from that of the executed movement, which always takes place when the image is vivid enough"
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Mach is doing something sly here: he demotes “will” from sovereign commander to a kind of internal theater. The movement we think we decide to make lives first as a representation, an image staged in the mind, and that staging belongs to a different “domain” than muscle actually contracting in the world. It’s a quietly radical separation. Instead of treating intention as a metaphysical force that pushes matter around, Mach treats it as a perceptual event that can, under the right conditions, tip into action.
That last clause is the blade: executed movement “always takes place when the image is vivid enough.” He’s not romanticizing imagination; he’s mechanizing it. “Vivid enough” reads like an experimental variable, not a poetic flourish. The subtext is anti-Cartesian and anti-mystical: your sense of agency is less a free-floating inner power than the felt clarity and salience of a motor image within a larger sensory economy. Strengthen the representation and the body follows; weaken it and “will” starts to look like a story you tell after the fact.
Context matters. Mach, the physicist-philosopher who helped clear the ground for logical positivism, distrusted hidden entities and privileged what can be described in experience. This line aligns with that program: the self isn’t a ghost pulling levers but a nexus of sensations and representations that can be studied. It also prefigures modern debates in psychology and neuroscience about motor imagery, ideomotor action, and the uncomfortable possibility that “deciding” is often the mind narrating processes already underway. Mach’s cool phrasing makes the provocation harder to dismiss: if action tracks vividness, then freedom may be less about sheer willpower than about what the mind can render compelling.
That last clause is the blade: executed movement “always takes place when the image is vivid enough.” He’s not romanticizing imagination; he’s mechanizing it. “Vivid enough” reads like an experimental variable, not a poetic flourish. The subtext is anti-Cartesian and anti-mystical: your sense of agency is less a free-floating inner power than the felt clarity and salience of a motor image within a larger sensory economy. Strengthen the representation and the body follows; weaken it and “will” starts to look like a story you tell after the fact.
Context matters. Mach, the physicist-philosopher who helped clear the ground for logical positivism, distrusted hidden entities and privileged what can be described in experience. This line aligns with that program: the self isn’t a ghost pulling levers but a nexus of sensations and representations that can be studied. It also prefigures modern debates in psychology and neuroscience about motor imagery, ideomotor action, and the uncomfortable possibility that “deciding” is often the mind narrating processes already underway. Mach’s cool phrasing makes the provocation harder to dismiss: if action tracks vividness, then freedom may be less about sheer willpower than about what the mind can render compelling.
Quote Details
| Topic | Free Will & Fate |
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