"Bad reasoning as well as good reasoning is possible; and this fact is the foundation of the practical side of logic"
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Peirce slips a quiet provocation into an almost bureaucratic sentence: logic isn’t a celebration of human rationality; it’s damage control. By insisting that “bad reasoning as well as good reasoning is possible,” he rejects the comforting fantasy that thinking naturally trends toward truth if we just “use logic.” Error isn’t a glitch in the system; it’s a native feature. That’s the subtext that gives the line its bite: any account of reasoning that doesn’t build in the likelihood of self-deception, motivated inference, and sloppy habits is not merely incomplete, it’s useless.
The second clause sharpens the intent. Calling this “the foundation of the practical side of logic” reframes logic from a pristine set of forms into a toolbox for living among uncertainty. Practical logic isn’t about proving we’re right; it’s about creating procedures that make it harder to stay wrong. Peirce, a founder of pragmatism and a working scientist as much as a philosopher, treats reasoning like an experimental practice: you set up checks, you look for counterevidence, you cultivate methods that survive contact with reality. The point is not that good arguments exist in textbooks, but that communities need habits and standards that can discriminate between better and worse thinking in the wild.
Read against today’s algorithmic outrage and epistemic tribalism, the line lands like a warning label. If bad reasoning is always available, then “logic” as a moral badge is meaningless; what matters is the messy, social infrastructure that catches our mistakes before they calcify into conviction.
The second clause sharpens the intent. Calling this “the foundation of the practical side of logic” reframes logic from a pristine set of forms into a toolbox for living among uncertainty. Practical logic isn’t about proving we’re right; it’s about creating procedures that make it harder to stay wrong. Peirce, a founder of pragmatism and a working scientist as much as a philosopher, treats reasoning like an experimental practice: you set up checks, you look for counterevidence, you cultivate methods that survive contact with reality. The point is not that good arguments exist in textbooks, but that communities need habits and standards that can discriminate between better and worse thinking in the wild.
Read against today’s algorithmic outrage and epistemic tribalism, the line lands like a warning label. If bad reasoning is always available, then “logic” as a moral badge is meaningless; what matters is the messy, social infrastructure that catches our mistakes before they calcify into conviction.
Quote Details
| Topic | Reason & Logic |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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