"Bush's war in Iraq has done untold damage to the United States. It has impaired our military power and undermined the morale of our armed forces. Our troops were trained to project overwhelming power. They were not trained for occupation duties"
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Soros isn’t lamenting a mismanaged campaign so much as indicting a strategic self-harm that masqueraded as strength. The phrase “untold damage” does two jobs at once: it signals that the true costs are larger than any official accounting, and it implies a deliberate refusal by leadership to tally them honestly. Coming from a financier who thinks in risk, leverage, and blowback, the line reads like an audit of American power after it’s been overextended.
The most pointed move is the contrast between “project overwhelming power” and “occupation duties.” Soros draws a bright line between what the U.S. military was built to do (decisive, high-intensity force) and what Iraq demanded (patient governance, legitimacy, cultural fluency, political restraint). That contrast is also an argument about national identity: America prefers the clean story of victory to the messy reality of responsibility. By insisting troops “were not trained,” he shifts blame upward, away from soldiers and onto civilian architects who treated war as a quick transaction rather than a long-term liability.
The subtext is morale as a strategic asset, not just a human one. “Undermined” suggests corrosion from within: repeated deployments, ambiguous objectives, and the cognitive dissonance of being asked to win a war that keeps changing its definition of “win.” In the post-9/11 era, when toughness was a political brand, Soros punctures that branding with a cold, institutional claim: power isn’t just firepower; it’s credibility, readiness, and the ability to choose your next move. Iraq, in this framing, spent those reserves for an occupation the U.S. hadn’t prepared to own.
The most pointed move is the contrast between “project overwhelming power” and “occupation duties.” Soros draws a bright line between what the U.S. military was built to do (decisive, high-intensity force) and what Iraq demanded (patient governance, legitimacy, cultural fluency, political restraint). That contrast is also an argument about national identity: America prefers the clean story of victory to the messy reality of responsibility. By insisting troops “were not trained,” he shifts blame upward, away from soldiers and onto civilian architects who treated war as a quick transaction rather than a long-term liability.
The subtext is morale as a strategic asset, not just a human one. “Undermined” suggests corrosion from within: repeated deployments, ambiguous objectives, and the cognitive dissonance of being asked to win a war that keeps changing its definition of “win.” In the post-9/11 era, when toughness was a political brand, Soros punctures that branding with a cold, institutional claim: power isn’t just firepower; it’s credibility, readiness, and the ability to choose your next move. Iraq, in this framing, spent those reserves for an occupation the U.S. hadn’t prepared to own.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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