"But in simple substances the influence of one monad over another is ideal only"
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Leibniz is quietly detonating the commonsense picture of a world where things shove other things around. When he writes that, in simple substances, one monad's influence over another is "ideal only", he's drawing a hard line between reality as mechanism and reality as metaphysics. Monads, in his system, are the indivisible, soul-like units of being: they have no windows, no physical pores through which causal traffic could pass. So any talk of one monad affecting another can only be "ideal" - a matter of how their internal states line up in our description, not a literal push-and-pull across space.
The intent is defensive and ambitious at once. Defensive, because Leibniz is trying to protect a robust notion of substance from Descartes' dualism and from a purely materialist physics that threatens to reduce everything to external collision. Ambitious, because he still wants the orderly predictability of science. His solution is the famous pre-established harmony: God "programs" each monad's unfolding so that they correspond without contact, like perfectly synchronized clocks that never exchange signals.
The subtext is a critique of naive causation. When you think the billiard ball caused the other ball to move, you're projecting an explanatory shortcut onto what is, at bottom, a coordinated sequence of perceptions and appetitions inside distinct substances. Leibniz makes causality look less like brute force and more like translation: the world hangs together because its parts are authored to cohere, not because they physically negotiate with each other.
The intent is defensive and ambitious at once. Defensive, because Leibniz is trying to protect a robust notion of substance from Descartes' dualism and from a purely materialist physics that threatens to reduce everything to external collision. Ambitious, because he still wants the orderly predictability of science. His solution is the famous pre-established harmony: God "programs" each monad's unfolding so that they correspond without contact, like perfectly synchronized clocks that never exchange signals.
The subtext is a critique of naive causation. When you think the billiard ball caused the other ball to move, you're projecting an explanatory shortcut onto what is, at bottom, a coordinated sequence of perceptions and appetitions inside distinct substances. Leibniz makes causality look less like brute force and more like translation: the world hangs together because its parts are authored to cohere, not because they physically negotiate with each other.
Quote Details
| Topic | Reason & Logic |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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