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Daily Inspiration Quote by Samuel Alexander

"But though cognition is not an element of mental action, nor even in any real sense of the word an aspect of it, the distinction of cognition and conation has if properly defined a definite value"

About this Quote

Samuel Alexander is doing that very philosopher thing where he sounds like he’s demolishing a concept while quietly trying to rescue it. On the surface, he’s denying that cognition - knowing, representing, thinking-about - belongs inside “mental action” at all. He even refuses the softer compromise that cognition is an “aspect” of action. That’s a deliberate provocation: a push against the common habit of treating the mind as primarily a spectator, with action as an optional add-on.

The subtext is pragmatic and diagnostic. Alexander isn’t arguing that cognition is unreal; he’s arguing that when we’re analyzing action, cognition doesn’t do the kind of work people assume it does. Mental action, for him, is anchored in conation: striving, intending, directing energy toward ends. Cognition can accompany that striving, inform it, frame it, but it’s not the engine. He’s trying to prevent philosophers from smuggling agency into “knowledge” and then acting surprised when agency appears.

The real intent arrives in the second clause: “the distinction of cognition and conation has if properly defined a definite value.” That’s the pivot from iconoclasm to housekeeping. He’s warning against sloppy dichotomies while keeping a sharper one: not mind-versus-body, not reason-versus-emotion, but representation-versus-direction. In early 20th-century philosophy and psychology - when introspectionism, emergentism, and evolutionary accounts of mind were colliding - Alexander is carving a tool for analysis: cognition as content, conation as the vector. Defined carefully, the split doesn’t mystify the mind; it stops us from mistaking a map for a motive.

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TopicReason & Logic
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APA Style (7th ed.)
Alexander, Samuel. (n.d.). But though cognition is not an element of mental action, nor even in any real sense of the word an aspect of it, the distinction of cognition and conation has if properly defined a definite value. FixQuotes. https://fixquotes.com/quotes/but-though-cognition-is-not-an-element-of-mental-147965/

Chicago Style
Alexander, Samuel. "But though cognition is not an element of mental action, nor even in any real sense of the word an aspect of it, the distinction of cognition and conation has if properly defined a definite value." FixQuotes. Accessed February 2, 2026. https://fixquotes.com/quotes/but-though-cognition-is-not-an-element-of-mental-147965/.

MLA Style (9th ed.)
"But though cognition is not an element of mental action, nor even in any real sense of the word an aspect of it, the distinction of cognition and conation has if properly defined a definite value." FixQuotes, https://fixquotes.com/quotes/but-though-cognition-is-not-an-element-of-mental-147965/. Accessed 2 Feb. 2026.

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Cognition and Conation Distinction by Samuel Alexander
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Samuel Alexander (January 6, 1859 - September 13, 1938) was a Philosopher from Australia.

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