"Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable"
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Nagel’s line lands like a polite grenade: the mind-body problem isn’t hard because we lack clever theories, but because consciousness won’t sit still long enough to be theorized. “Intractable” is doing real work here. It signals not a temporary gap in neuroscience, but a stubborn mismatch between the kinds of things physics explains (structure, function, causal chains) and what experience is (the felt “what-it’s-like” from the inside). The subtext is a rebuke to the confident reductionism of mid-to-late 20th century analytic philosophy and cognitive science, where many thinkers treated the mind as just another machine waiting to be reverse-engineered.
Nagel’s broader context is his famous pressure test: even a perfectly complete objective description can fail to capture subjective life. His bat essay (“What is it like to be a bat?”) isn’t a cute thought experiment; it’s a methodological challenge. You can map sonar pathways all day and still miss the point that experience has a first-person character that doesn’t translate cleanly into third-person terms. That’s why consciousness makes the problem “really” intractable: it’s the part that resists being turned into data without remainder.
The intent isn’t to mystify consciousness or smuggle in spooky metaphysics. It’s to force intellectual honesty about explanatory limits. If your theory of mind leaves out experience because it doesn’t fit the model, you haven’t solved the mind-body problem; you’ve redefined it until it stops being inconvenient.
Nagel’s broader context is his famous pressure test: even a perfectly complete objective description can fail to capture subjective life. His bat essay (“What is it like to be a bat?”) isn’t a cute thought experiment; it’s a methodological challenge. You can map sonar pathways all day and still miss the point that experience has a first-person character that doesn’t translate cleanly into third-person terms. That’s why consciousness makes the problem “really” intractable: it’s the part that resists being turned into data without remainder.
The intent isn’t to mystify consciousness or smuggle in spooky metaphysics. It’s to force intellectual honesty about explanatory limits. If your theory of mind leaves out experience because it doesn’t fit the model, you haven’t solved the mind-body problem; you’ve redefined it until it stops being inconvenient.
Quote Details
| Topic | Deep |
|---|---|
| Source | Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), The Philosophical Review — commonly cited source for the line "Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable." |
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