"Diplomacy in general does not resolve conflicts. Wars end not due to peace processes, but due to one side giving up"
About this Quote
Daniel Pipes, a historian and commentator on the Middle East, distills a hard realist view: wars end when one side concludes that further fighting is futile, and diplomacy, at best, records that decision. The claim flips the usual faith in peace processes by arguing that power, not procedure, determines outcomes. It echoes the bargaining model of war, where combat reveals information and shifts expectations until one party updates its beliefs and yields, and the conflict terminates.
History offers support. World War II ended with unconditional surrenders; diplomacy formalized what overwhelming force decided. The Vietnam War concluded when the United States accepted that its aims were unattainable at acceptable cost, and North Vietnam persisted to victory. In Bosnia, the Dayton Accords followed NATO airstrikes and battlefield changes; negotiation ratified facts created by coercion. Even many durable Middle Eastern deals, such as the Egyptian-Israeli peace, came only after 1973 reset perceptions of risk, making compromise rational once the costs of continued war were clear.
Yet the view is deliberately stark. Diplomacy can shape incentives, reveal private information, and create face-saving exits that make giving up politically survivable. The Good Friday Agreement did not emerge from decisive victory but from a mutually hurting stalemate, institutional guarantees, and third-party enforcement that lowered the risk of defection. The Korean War ended in an armistice, not surrender; diplomacy froze a balance neither side could cheaply overturn. Coercion and negotiation often intertwine: the Cuban Missile Crisis mixed blockade and back-channel trade-offs, pairing pressure with a credible off-ramp.
Pipes issues a warning against fetishizing process. Treaties without shifts in power or credible enforcement are brittle. Durable settlements rest on altered calculations about costs, risks, and the likelihood of compliance. Diplomacy is most effective when it does not try to conjure peace from atmospherics, but when it translates hard strategic realities into workable, enforceable arrangements.
History offers support. World War II ended with unconditional surrenders; diplomacy formalized what overwhelming force decided. The Vietnam War concluded when the United States accepted that its aims were unattainable at acceptable cost, and North Vietnam persisted to victory. In Bosnia, the Dayton Accords followed NATO airstrikes and battlefield changes; negotiation ratified facts created by coercion. Even many durable Middle Eastern deals, such as the Egyptian-Israeli peace, came only after 1973 reset perceptions of risk, making compromise rational once the costs of continued war were clear.
Yet the view is deliberately stark. Diplomacy can shape incentives, reveal private information, and create face-saving exits that make giving up politically survivable. The Good Friday Agreement did not emerge from decisive victory but from a mutually hurting stalemate, institutional guarantees, and third-party enforcement that lowered the risk of defection. The Korean War ended in an armistice, not surrender; diplomacy froze a balance neither side could cheaply overturn. Coercion and negotiation often intertwine: the Cuban Missile Crisis mixed blockade and back-channel trade-offs, pairing pressure with a credible off-ramp.
Pipes issues a warning against fetishizing process. Treaties without shifts in power or credible enforcement are brittle. Durable settlements rest on altered calculations about costs, risks, and the likelihood of compliance. Diplomacy is most effective when it does not try to conjure peace from atmospherics, but when it translates hard strategic realities into workable, enforceable arrangements.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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