"Don't let that weapon technology proliferate. Don't let Saddam Hussein get capability for nuclear or chemical weapons, because he's already shown a willingness to use any weapon at his disposal"
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The line sells prevention as common sense, but it’s really a political permission slip. Sununu frames the issue as “weapon technology” and “capability” rather than a specific, imminent act. That matters: capability is expandable and speculative, a moving target that can justify open-ended pressure, sanctions, covert action, or war. It’s a classic shift from policing behavior to policing potential.
The repetition of “Don’t let…” works like a drumbeat, turning foreign policy into a moral reflex. It recruits the listener into a shared vigilance, implying that restraint is negligence. Sununu’s Saddam is not just an adversary; he’s a proven rule-breaker who will use “any weapon at his disposal.” That phrase is doing heavy lifting: it collapses distinctions between chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons into one ominous bucket, flattening public debate into a binary of stop him or enable him. It also treats intent as settled, not contingent on circumstances, deterrence, or diplomacy.
Contextually, this rhetoric fits the late Cold War/early post-Cold War U.S. posture toward Iraq: Saddam Hussein as the archetype of the unpredictable strongman, especially after chemical weapons use and regional aggression. The subtext is less about Iraq alone than about U.S. credibility in a world where proliferation anxiety was becoming the organizing principle of intervention. It primes the audience to accept preemption: if you wait for the “use,” you’ve already lost.
The repetition of “Don’t let…” works like a drumbeat, turning foreign policy into a moral reflex. It recruits the listener into a shared vigilance, implying that restraint is negligence. Sununu’s Saddam is not just an adversary; he’s a proven rule-breaker who will use “any weapon at his disposal.” That phrase is doing heavy lifting: it collapses distinctions between chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons into one ominous bucket, flattening public debate into a binary of stop him or enable him. It also treats intent as settled, not contingent on circumstances, deterrence, or diplomacy.
Contextually, this rhetoric fits the late Cold War/early post-Cold War U.S. posture toward Iraq: Saddam Hussein as the archetype of the unpredictable strongman, especially after chemical weapons use and regional aggression. The subtext is less about Iraq alone than about U.S. credibility in a world where proliferation anxiety was becoming the organizing principle of intervention. It primes the audience to accept preemption: if you wait for the “use,” you’ve already lost.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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