"He who can be, and therefore is, another's, and he who participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, is a slave by nature"
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Aristotle doesn’t smuggle slavery in as an accident of history; he drafts it as a feature of the cosmos. The sentence is engineered like a syllogism with moral consequences: if someone “can be” another’s property, then he “therefore is” another’s property. Capability becomes destiny, and destiny becomes a political permission slip. That “therefore” is the hinge. It converts a descriptive claim about human differences into a normative architecture for domination.
The phrase “participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have” is doing quiet, vicious work. Aristotle grants the enslaved a kind of dim rationality - sufficient to understand orders, insufficient to author a life. It’s a rhetorical compromise that makes exploitation look efficient rather than cruel: the slave is imagined as an instrument that can interpret the master’s mind, not generate one. Subtext: rule is not merely imposed; it is supposedly completed through the master, as if ownership were a form of mentorship for those incapable of self-direction.
Context matters. In fourth-century BCE Athens, slavery is not a marginal practice; it’s economic infrastructure, stitched into household management and civic leisure. Aristotle’s Politics aims to naturalize the polis: to argue that hierarchy is not only common but “natural” - a word that, for him, carries the weight of teleology. By classifying some people as “slaves by nature,” he protects the ideal citizen’s freedom from the moral contamination of dependency. The move is brutally elegant: freedom is reserved for those already positioned to practice it, and inequality is rebranded as order.
The phrase “participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have” is doing quiet, vicious work. Aristotle grants the enslaved a kind of dim rationality - sufficient to understand orders, insufficient to author a life. It’s a rhetorical compromise that makes exploitation look efficient rather than cruel: the slave is imagined as an instrument that can interpret the master’s mind, not generate one. Subtext: rule is not merely imposed; it is supposedly completed through the master, as if ownership were a form of mentorship for those incapable of self-direction.
Context matters. In fourth-century BCE Athens, slavery is not a marginal practice; it’s economic infrastructure, stitched into household management and civic leisure. Aristotle’s Politics aims to naturalize the polis: to argue that hierarchy is not only common but “natural” - a word that, for him, carries the weight of teleology. By classifying some people as “slaves by nature,” he protects the ideal citizen’s freedom from the moral contamination of dependency. The move is brutally elegant: freedom is reserved for those already positioned to practice it, and inequality is rebranded as order.
Quote Details
| Topic | Reason & Logic |
|---|---|
| Source | Aristotle, Politics, Book I (section 1254b) — Jowett translation; passage on natural slavery (he who can be another's, and who partakes of reason only to perceive, is a slave by nature). |
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