"I also argued before the war that the administration was underestimating Arab nationalism and Iraqi nationalism, that it was not going to be as easy to rule Iraq as they thought"
About this Quote
A quiet flex disguised as regret, Juan Cole’s line is really about epistemic failure: the kind that happens when power treats local identity as a logistical detail. His phrasing, “I also argued before the war,” positions him as an early dissenter, but the target isn’t personal vindication so much as the system that made dissent ignorable. The verb “underestimating” does heavy lifting. It implies not just a bad forecast, but a habitual arrogance: a belief that nationalism is malleable, that populations can be managed like territory.
The key move is the pairing of “Arab nationalism” and “Iraqi nationalism.” He’s flagging something U.S. planners often flattened into one “Middle East” problem: overlapping loyalties that can unite against an occupier even when they clash internally. That’s the subtext behind “not going to be as easy to rule Iraq as they thought.” “Rule” is blunt, almost accusatory; it strips away the softer rhetoric of “liberation” and “reconstruction” and names what occupation looks like from the ground. He’s also implying that the administration’s model of Iraq was essentially administrative, not political: topple a regime, install new institutions, expect compliance.
Context matters: post-9/11 certainty, pre-invasion confidence, and a policy culture that prized speed, tech, and messaging over deep regional knowledge. Cole, as an academic, is asserting that expertise existed and was voiced; it simply didn’t fit the script. The quote works because it indicts more than one war plan - it indicts a recurring American habit of treating nationalism as an inconvenience until it becomes the headline.
The key move is the pairing of “Arab nationalism” and “Iraqi nationalism.” He’s flagging something U.S. planners often flattened into one “Middle East” problem: overlapping loyalties that can unite against an occupier even when they clash internally. That’s the subtext behind “not going to be as easy to rule Iraq as they thought.” “Rule” is blunt, almost accusatory; it strips away the softer rhetoric of “liberation” and “reconstruction” and names what occupation looks like from the ground. He’s also implying that the administration’s model of Iraq was essentially administrative, not political: topple a regime, install new institutions, expect compliance.
Context matters: post-9/11 certainty, pre-invasion confidence, and a policy culture that prized speed, tech, and messaging over deep regional knowledge. Cole, as an academic, is asserting that expertise existed and was voiced; it simply didn’t fit the script. The quote works because it indicts more than one war plan - it indicts a recurring American habit of treating nationalism as an inconvenience until it becomes the headline.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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