"I am concerned, rather, that there should not be more things dreamt of in my philosophy than there actually are in heaven and earth"
About this Quote
Goodman twists Hamlet into a warning shot at philosophers who treat imagination as entitlement. Where Shakespeare’s line flatters the world’s excess - more in heaven and earth than Horatio’s tidy system can hold - Goodman flips the anxiety: what if our systems invent more furniture than reality provides? It’s a neat bit of intellectual judo. The joke lands because it targets a familiar philosophical vice: the urge to solve problems by minting new entities, hidden structures, or “really real” layers behind everyday talk.
The intent is methodological, not mystical. Goodman is signaling suspicion toward metaphysical overproduction: universals, essences, possible worlds, shadowy “meanings” - whatever a theory can’t explain, it often tries to populate. His subtext is a demand for discipline: explanations should earn their ontology. The line also carries a self-aware irony, because Goodman isn’t a naïve realist policing imagination. In work like Ways of Worldmaking, he argues that we construct “world-versions” through symbol systems. The constraint, then, isn’t “stick to the given,” but “don’t confuse a useful version with a claim that the universe must contain the things your version posits.”
Context matters: mid-20th-century analytic philosophy, where logical rigor sometimes tempted thinkers into baroque ontologies dressed up as clarity. Goodman’s phrasing performs what it advocates: sharp, memorable economy. He makes metaphysical restraint sound not pious but practical, like balancing a budget. The world is already complicated; philosophy shouldn’t inflate it just to feel explanatory.
The intent is methodological, not mystical. Goodman is signaling suspicion toward metaphysical overproduction: universals, essences, possible worlds, shadowy “meanings” - whatever a theory can’t explain, it often tries to populate. His subtext is a demand for discipline: explanations should earn their ontology. The line also carries a self-aware irony, because Goodman isn’t a naïve realist policing imagination. In work like Ways of Worldmaking, he argues that we construct “world-versions” through symbol systems. The constraint, then, isn’t “stick to the given,” but “don’t confuse a useful version with a claim that the universe must contain the things your version posits.”
Context matters: mid-20th-century analytic philosophy, where logical rigor sometimes tempted thinkers into baroque ontologies dressed up as clarity. Goodman’s phrasing performs what it advocates: sharp, memorable economy. He makes metaphysical restraint sound not pious but practical, like balancing a budget. The world is already complicated; philosophy shouldn’t inflate it just to feel explanatory.
Quote Details
| Topic | Truth |
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