"I feel that an understanding could be reached with Germany which would result in a lasting peace with Europe and believe that a German victory is preferable to a British and Soviet victory"
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Laval’s sentence is collaboration dressed up as statesmanship: a promise of “lasting peace” that smuggles in capitulation as prudence. The key word is “understanding” - not a treaty between equals, but a euphemism for accommodation with a conquering power. In 1940-42 Europe, “peace” didn’t mean stability; it meant accepting the new hierarchy Germany was imposing, then calling it order.
The second clause does the real work. By saying a “German victory is preferable to a British and Soviet victory,” Laval isn’t merely picking winners; he’s redefining France’s interests around fear and ideology. Britain represents stubborn democratic resistance and the possibility of a prolonged war that would keep France a battlefield. The Soviet Union is the specter that Laval, like many conservatives and centrists of the era, treats as an existential threat. He frames Germany as the lesser evil - a continental, anti-communist hegemon with whom one can supposedly negotiate - while casting Anglo-Soviet success as chaos, revenge, and social upheaval.
The intent is tactical and self-protective: justify Vichy’s cooperation, normalize the choice, and present collaboration as the sober alternative to “extremes.” The subtext is also personal. Laval was a politician trying to preserve relevance under occupation, selling the idea that France could buy a seat at the table by helping set it. History makes the line ring with bitter irony: the “understanding” he imagined required moral surrender first, and delivered neither peace nor leverage, only deeper entanglement in Germany’s crimes.
The second clause does the real work. By saying a “German victory is preferable to a British and Soviet victory,” Laval isn’t merely picking winners; he’s redefining France’s interests around fear and ideology. Britain represents stubborn democratic resistance and the possibility of a prolonged war that would keep France a battlefield. The Soviet Union is the specter that Laval, like many conservatives and centrists of the era, treats as an existential threat. He frames Germany as the lesser evil - a continental, anti-communist hegemon with whom one can supposedly negotiate - while casting Anglo-Soviet success as chaos, revenge, and social upheaval.
The intent is tactical and self-protective: justify Vichy’s cooperation, normalize the choice, and present collaboration as the sober alternative to “extremes.” The subtext is also personal. Laval was a politician trying to preserve relevance under occupation, selling the idea that France could buy a seat at the table by helping set it. History makes the line ring with bitter irony: the “understanding” he imagined required moral surrender first, and delivered neither peace nor leverage, only deeper entanglement in Germany’s crimes.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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