"I remain convinced that obstinate addiction to ordinary language in our private thoughts is one of the main obstacles to progress in philosophy"
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Russell is taking a swing at the most intimate conservative force of all: the sentences we silently narrate our lives with. He’s not complaining about bad vocabulary; he’s indicting “ordinary language” as a kind of mental default setting that smuggles folk metaphysics into serious inquiry. If your private thoughts come pre-packaged in everyday grammar, you inherit its hidden commitments: that “things” must be substances, that verbs name real actions, that every meaningful phrase points to a tidy object. Philosophy, in Russell’s view, stalls when it mistakes these linguistic conveniences for the structure of reality.
The sting is in “obstinate addiction.” Ordinary language isn’t merely insufficient; it’s sticky, pleasurable, even self-soothing. We cling to it because it makes the world feel legible. Russell’s subtext is that philosophers often congratulate themselves on rigor while thinking in the same old idioms that generate the problems they claim to solve. The private theater matters: you can publish formal logic, but if your inner monologue still runs on common-sense categories, you’ll reproduce common-sense confusions.
Contextually, this is Russell the analytic revolutionary, writing in the long shadow of Frege and alongside early Wittgenstein, when logic and the “analysis” of propositions promised a way to dissolve centuries of metaphysical fog. The intent isn’t elitism for its own sake; it’s methodological. Progress requires redesigning the tools of thought, not just arguing harder with the tools you grew up with. Ordinary language is useful for living; Russell’s provocation is that it’s a terrible master for understanding.
The sting is in “obstinate addiction.” Ordinary language isn’t merely insufficient; it’s sticky, pleasurable, even self-soothing. We cling to it because it makes the world feel legible. Russell’s subtext is that philosophers often congratulate themselves on rigor while thinking in the same old idioms that generate the problems they claim to solve. The private theater matters: you can publish formal logic, but if your inner monologue still runs on common-sense categories, you’ll reproduce common-sense confusions.
Contextually, this is Russell the analytic revolutionary, writing in the long shadow of Frege and alongside early Wittgenstein, when logic and the “analysis” of propositions promised a way to dissolve centuries of metaphysical fog. The intent isn’t elitism for its own sake; it’s methodological. Progress requires redesigning the tools of thought, not just arguing harder with the tools you grew up with. Ordinary language is useful for living; Russell’s provocation is that it’s a terrible master for understanding.
Quote Details
| Topic | Reason & Logic |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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