"I wouldn't even know - and I spent three years in the CIA - I wouldn't even know how you'd start a covert action program in a place like Iran. It would be extraordinarily difficult"
About this Quote
Carlucci’s line lands like an anti-thriller: a senior U.S. hand, credentialed by “three years in the CIA,” admitting not just uncertainty but procedural bafflement. The repetition - “I wouldn’t even know… I wouldn’t even know” - is doing more than emphasizing difficulty. It’s a deliberate public dampener, a way of stripping glamour from covert action and replacing it with bureaucratic reality: you can’t simply will a secret war into existence because Washington wants one.
The specific intent reads as preemption. In moments when Iran becomes a political obsession, the demand for “something decisive” often slides into fantasies of clandestine leverage. Carlucci is cautioning policymakers and the public: Iran is not a pliable client state, and the U.S. is not omnipotent. His choice of “start” is key. He’s not debating whether covert action is moral; he’s challenging the premise that it’s operationally feasible at all.
The subtext is institutional and political self-protection, too. By framing the task as “extraordinarily difficult,” he signals the hidden costs: blown networks, unreliable proxies, language and cultural barriers, counterintelligence that expects intrusion, and the inevitable “plausible deniability” that collapses the minute something goes wrong. It’s also a quiet rebuke to armchair strategists and cable-news bravado: serious operators know the difference between capability and control.
Contextually, this fits a post-Iran-Contra, post-hostage-crisis realism about Iran: a hardened state with dense internal security and a long memory of foreign meddling. Carlucci’s cynicism isn’t theatrical; it’s managerial. He’s telling you that the covert option is often less an option than a wish.
The specific intent reads as preemption. In moments when Iran becomes a political obsession, the demand for “something decisive” often slides into fantasies of clandestine leverage. Carlucci is cautioning policymakers and the public: Iran is not a pliable client state, and the U.S. is not omnipotent. His choice of “start” is key. He’s not debating whether covert action is moral; he’s challenging the premise that it’s operationally feasible at all.
The subtext is institutional and political self-protection, too. By framing the task as “extraordinarily difficult,” he signals the hidden costs: blown networks, unreliable proxies, language and cultural barriers, counterintelligence that expects intrusion, and the inevitable “plausible deniability” that collapses the minute something goes wrong. It’s also a quiet rebuke to armchair strategists and cable-news bravado: serious operators know the difference between capability and control.
Contextually, this fits a post-Iran-Contra, post-hostage-crisis realism about Iran: a hardened state with dense internal security and a long memory of foreign meddling. Carlucci’s cynicism isn’t theatrical; it’s managerial. He’s telling you that the covert option is often less an option than a wish.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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