"In fact, it is a farce to call any being virtuous whose virtues do not result from the exercise of its own reason"
About this Quote
Virtue, Wollstonecraft insists, is not a decorative label you pin on compliant people; it is a skill earned through thinking. The line is engineered as a provocation: calling it a "farce" isn’t polite disagreement, it’s an exposure of a social con. In her world, women were praised for docility, piety, and "goodness" precisely when those traits were trained into them through dependence and restricted education. She treats that arrangement as moral theater: society applauds the performance of virtue while withholding the very tool that could make virtue real.
The key move is her standard for legitimacy: virtues must "result from the exercise of its own reason". That phrasing quietly detonates a whole moral economy built on obedience. If goodness is merely habit, fear, or imitation, it’s not goodness at all; it’s management. Wollstonecraft reframes moral praise as political technology: a culture that rewards unreasoning "virtue" is really rewarding governability.
Context matters. Writing in the wake of the Enlightenment and alongside revolutionary arguments about rights, she applies the era’s faith in rational agency to those excluded from it. Her target isn’t religion or morality per se; it’s the way moral language is used to justify inequality. The subtext is radical and practical: educate people as reasoning beings, and you don’t just liberate minds, you raise the bar for what counts as ethical. Virtue becomes less about purity and more about autonomy, which is why the sentence still feels like a live wire in debates about agency, social conditioning, and "good" behavior that’s really just learned compliance.
The key move is her standard for legitimacy: virtues must "result from the exercise of its own reason". That phrasing quietly detonates a whole moral economy built on obedience. If goodness is merely habit, fear, or imitation, it’s not goodness at all; it’s management. Wollstonecraft reframes moral praise as political technology: a culture that rewards unreasoning "virtue" is really rewarding governability.
Context matters. Writing in the wake of the Enlightenment and alongside revolutionary arguments about rights, she applies the era’s faith in rational agency to those excluded from it. Her target isn’t religion or morality per se; it’s the way moral language is used to justify inequality. The subtext is radical and practical: educate people as reasoning beings, and you don’t just liberate minds, you raise the bar for what counts as ethical. Virtue becomes less about purity and more about autonomy, which is why the sentence still feels like a live wire in debates about agency, social conditioning, and "good" behavior that’s really just learned compliance.
Quote Details
| Topic | Ethics & Morality |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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