"In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived"
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Alexander is doing something deceptively simple: splitting the world into two clean seams just to show you how messy the stitching really is. “In the perception of a tree” sounds like a pastoral stroll, but it’s a laboratory setup. The tree is ordinary on purpose. If even this solid, commonsense object requires us to separate the act of perceiving from the thing perceived, then every confident claim about “what’s out there” starts to wobble.
The intent is methodological. Alexander, writing in the early 20th-century wake of British idealism and amid the rising prestige of psychology and the sciences, is staking out a realist position that still takes consciousness seriously. He refuses the lazy slide where a “tree” becomes merely a bundle of sensations, while also refusing the opposite fantasy that perception is a transparent window. The subtext: your mind is not the world, but it is never not involved in how the world shows up.
What makes the line work is its grammatical discipline. The paired phrases - “experiencing… experienced,” “perceiving… perceived” - force a symmetry that feels obvious, almost tautological, and that’s the trap. Once you accept the distinction, questions pour in: what exactly is the “act” made of (attention, memory, expectation)? What counts as the “thing” (the physical tree, the tree-as-appearing, the tree-in-context)? Alexander is prepping the reader for his larger project in emergentism: mind and world are related without being reducible, with reality unfolding in layers. A tree isn’t just seen; it’s a case study in how perception builds a bridge without collapsing either shore.
The intent is methodological. Alexander, writing in the early 20th-century wake of British idealism and amid the rising prestige of psychology and the sciences, is staking out a realist position that still takes consciousness seriously. He refuses the lazy slide where a “tree” becomes merely a bundle of sensations, while also refusing the opposite fantasy that perception is a transparent window. The subtext: your mind is not the world, but it is never not involved in how the world shows up.
What makes the line work is its grammatical discipline. The paired phrases - “experiencing… experienced,” “perceiving… perceived” - force a symmetry that feels obvious, almost tautological, and that’s the trap. Once you accept the distinction, questions pour in: what exactly is the “act” made of (attention, memory, expectation)? What counts as the “thing” (the physical tree, the tree-as-appearing, the tree-in-context)? Alexander is prepping the reader for his larger project in emergentism: mind and world are related without being reducible, with reality unfolding in layers. A tree isn’t just seen; it’s a case study in how perception builds a bridge without collapsing either shore.
Quote Details
| Topic | Wisdom |
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