"Increased and better screening for explosives is necessary - and Congress should fund it and TSA should implement it as quickly as possible - however that screening doesn't reduce the risk posed by a trained terrorist with an unconventional weapon"
About this Quote
Reichert’s line is a neat piece of political jujitsu: endorse the obvious, then pry open a larger argument about vulnerability. He starts with the safest possible premise - “increased and better screening” - and pairs it with a direct assignment of duties (Congress pays, TSA executes). That’s not just policy talk; it’s accountability theater, the kind that signals seriousness without taking a controversial stand against security measures that most voters already expect.
The pivot is where the real intent lives: “however.” In one stroke, he reclassifies improved screening from solution to symbol. The subtext is that airport security, as commonly imagined, is always fighting the last war. Explosives screening is framed as necessary but structurally inadequate against a “trained terrorist” using “an unconventional weapon.” That phrase quietly broadens the threat landscape beyond what scanners can catch, and it smuggles in permission for a different menu of responses: intelligence gathering, surveillance, behavioral profiling, counter-radicalization, even expanded law-enforcement powers.
Context matters because this kind of rhetoric typically surfaces after a near-miss or a new tactic hits headlines, when public pressure demands visible action. Reichert is trying to manage two audiences at once: constituents who want tangible upgrades at checkpoints, and security insiders who know the adversary adapts faster than procurement cycles. The line is a hedge against future blame. If something happens despite new screening, he has already inoculated himself: he supported funding, and he warned that hardware can’t neutralize ingenuity.
The pivot is where the real intent lives: “however.” In one stroke, he reclassifies improved screening from solution to symbol. The subtext is that airport security, as commonly imagined, is always fighting the last war. Explosives screening is framed as necessary but structurally inadequate against a “trained terrorist” using “an unconventional weapon.” That phrase quietly broadens the threat landscape beyond what scanners can catch, and it smuggles in permission for a different menu of responses: intelligence gathering, surveillance, behavioral profiling, counter-radicalization, even expanded law-enforcement powers.
Context matters because this kind of rhetoric typically surfaces after a near-miss or a new tactic hits headlines, when public pressure demands visible action. Reichert is trying to manage two audiences at once: constituents who want tangible upgrades at checkpoints, and security insiders who know the adversary adapts faster than procurement cycles. The line is a hedge against future blame. If something happens despite new screening, he has already inoculated himself: he supported funding, and he warned that hardware can’t neutralize ingenuity.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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