"It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger"
About this Quote
Hume’s line is philosophy with a switchblade: clean, shocking, and aimed at your moral self-image. The provocation isn’t that he endorses apocalypse over a papercut; it’s that he refuses to let “reason” do the moral work we keep assigning to it. If reason is just a calculator of means, it can’t generate ends. You can have impeccable logic and still pursue a grotesque preference. The sentence forces a split between rational consistency and moral sanity, exposing how often we smuggle values in under the label of “rational.”
The subtext is a demolition job on the idea that ethics can be derived from pure thought. Hume is setting up his famous point that passions and sentiments move us, while reason merely serves: it informs us what’s true, what causes what, what will happen if we choose X. It doesn’t tell us what to care about. That’s why the “scratching of my finger” matters: it’s petty, bodily, immediate. By placing it against “the whole world,” he dramatizes how a preference can be both coherent and monstrous, and how moral outrage is not a logical refutation.
Contextually, this is Enlightenment skepticism deployed against Enlightenment confidence. In an era hungry for rational foundations - for politics, science, religion, morality - Hume insists that the engine underneath is not reason’s purity but human psychology. The sting of the quote is diagnostic: if your ethics depends on reason alone, it’s defenseless against the person who simply doesn’t care.
The subtext is a demolition job on the idea that ethics can be derived from pure thought. Hume is setting up his famous point that passions and sentiments move us, while reason merely serves: it informs us what’s true, what causes what, what will happen if we choose X. It doesn’t tell us what to care about. That’s why the “scratching of my finger” matters: it’s petty, bodily, immediate. By placing it against “the whole world,” he dramatizes how a preference can be both coherent and monstrous, and how moral outrage is not a logical refutation.
Contextually, this is Enlightenment skepticism deployed against Enlightenment confidence. In an era hungry for rational foundations - for politics, science, religion, morality - Hume insists that the engine underneath is not reason’s purity but human psychology. The sting of the quote is diagnostic: if your ethics depends on reason alone, it’s defenseless against the person who simply doesn’t care.
Quote Details
| Topic | Reason & Logic |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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