"It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we say about Nature"
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Bohr lobs a grenade at the comforting idea that physics is a clean window onto reality. He’s not denying atoms or gravity; he’s refusing the fantasy that equations simply “mirror” Nature as it is in itself. The real target is metaphysical swagger: the claim that physicists can step outside the human situation and report the universe in unmediated, objective prose.
The line lands because it reframes scientific authority as linguistic discipline. “What we say” sounds modest, almost bureaucratic, but it’s a provocation: the limits of physics aren’t primarily technical, they’re conceptual. In quantum mechanics, the observer isn’t a detachable camera. Measurement isn’t passive viewing; it’s an interaction that forces outcomes into the narrow channels our instruments and concepts can register. Bohr’s Copenhagen sensibility insists that a “phenomenon” includes the experimental setup, the questions asked, the language available to answer them. Nature doesn’t show up labeled; we label it, under constraints.
The subtext is defensive and strategic. In the 1920s and 30s, quantum theory was shredding classical intuitions, and rivals like Einstein pushed for a deeper, more “real” account beneath probabilities. Bohr’s response is to relocate the argument: stop demanding a God’s-eye description and start policing what counts as a meaningful statement. It’s a philosopher’s move in a lab coat, and it still needles anyone who confuses predictive success with metaphysical certainty.
The line lands because it reframes scientific authority as linguistic discipline. “What we say” sounds modest, almost bureaucratic, but it’s a provocation: the limits of physics aren’t primarily technical, they’re conceptual. In quantum mechanics, the observer isn’t a detachable camera. Measurement isn’t passive viewing; it’s an interaction that forces outcomes into the narrow channels our instruments and concepts can register. Bohr’s Copenhagen sensibility insists that a “phenomenon” includes the experimental setup, the questions asked, the language available to answer them. Nature doesn’t show up labeled; we label it, under constraints.
The subtext is defensive and strategic. In the 1920s and 30s, quantum theory was shredding classical intuitions, and rivals like Einstein pushed for a deeper, more “real” account beneath probabilities. Bohr’s response is to relocate the argument: stop demanding a God’s-eye description and start policing what counts as a meaningful statement. It’s a philosopher’s move in a lab coat, and it still needles anyone who confuses predictive success with metaphysical certainty.
Quote Details
| Topic | Truth |
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