"It simply cannot be disputed that for decades the Palestinian leadership was more interested in there not being a Jewish state than in there being a Palestinian state"
About this Quote
The line distills a recurring critique in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict: that key Palestinian leaders invested more energy in denying Jewish self-determination than in constructing the political, institutional, and economic foundations for their own. The backdrop stretches from the 1947 UN partition plan, rejected by Arab states and Palestinian representatives, through the wars of 1948 and 1967, to the PLO Charter and the Khartoum Resolution’s Three Nos of 1967. For decades, formal recognition of Israel was refused, and armed struggle was elevated as the defining strategy.
There was a pivot. In 1988 the PLO accepted a two-state framework, and the Oslo Accords in the 1990s established mutual recognition and embryonic Palestinian institutions. Yet internal divisions, corruption, and the rise of Hamas, whose charter for years rejected Israel’s legitimacy, kept the politics of negation alive. Critics point to missed opportunities in 2000-2001 and 2008, as well as a failure to prioritize governance over resistance. Supporters counter that those offers were flawed, that settlements and military occupation progressively narrowed Palestinian horizons, and that sovereignty cannot be built under domination and fragmentation.
The claim that it “cannot be disputed” is rhetorical armor for a position that is, in fact, hotly contested. Still, the provocation forces a hard look at strategic priorities: nation-building requires difficult compromises, cultivation of civil institutions, and acceptance of coexistence. When leaders define success primarily as blocking the other side’s national project, they forfeit leverage over their own future.
Context also matters. Between 1948 and 1967, neither Jordan nor Egypt created a Palestinian state in the territories they controlled; after 1967, Israeli policies of settlement and closure eroded trust and feasibility. Both dynamics made constructive Palestinian politics harder and rejection more tempting. The lesson embedded in the criticism is sober: enduring peace demands leaders who invest more in making their people’s state real than in denying the other’s right to exist.
There was a pivot. In 1988 the PLO accepted a two-state framework, and the Oslo Accords in the 1990s established mutual recognition and embryonic Palestinian institutions. Yet internal divisions, corruption, and the rise of Hamas, whose charter for years rejected Israel’s legitimacy, kept the politics of negation alive. Critics point to missed opportunities in 2000-2001 and 2008, as well as a failure to prioritize governance over resistance. Supporters counter that those offers were flawed, that settlements and military occupation progressively narrowed Palestinian horizons, and that sovereignty cannot be built under domination and fragmentation.
The claim that it “cannot be disputed” is rhetorical armor for a position that is, in fact, hotly contested. Still, the provocation forces a hard look at strategic priorities: nation-building requires difficult compromises, cultivation of civil institutions, and acceptance of coexistence. When leaders define success primarily as blocking the other side’s national project, they forfeit leverage over their own future.
Context also matters. Between 1948 and 1967, neither Jordan nor Egypt created a Palestinian state in the territories they controlled; after 1967, Israeli policies of settlement and closure eroded trust and feasibility. Both dynamics made constructive Palestinian politics harder and rejection more tempting. The lesson embedded in the criticism is sober: enduring peace demands leaders who invest more in making their people’s state real than in denying the other’s right to exist.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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