"Men act like brutes in so far as the sequences of their perceptions arise through the principle of memory only, like those empirical physicians who have mere practice without theory"
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Leibniz is doing that very 17th-century thing: turning an argument about the mind into a moral diagnosis. “Men act like brutes” isn’t name-calling for sport; it’s a warning about what happens when human intelligence is reduced to a single mechanism, memory. If our “sequences of perceptions” are just one damn impression after another, linked only by habit and recall, then we’re basically running on reflex. The insult lands because it targets a fear specific to early modern philosophy: that people could be explainable machines, not responsible agents.
The comparison to “empirical physicians” sharpens the blade. In Leibniz’s era, medicine was split between craft knowledge (what seemed to work) and emerging theoretical systems trying to explain why. He’s not dismissing experience; he’s mocking experience without a conceptual scaffold. The “mere practice without theory” line reads like a critique of intellectual complacency: you can accumulate cases, anecdotes, and routines and still never rise to understanding. You become competent, even effective, while remaining blind.
Subtextually, Leibniz is defending his larger project against rivals like Locke and the more associationist strains of empiricism: the mind isn’t just a storehouse of remembered sensations. There are principles - innate structures, rational relations, “reasons” - that organize perception into knowledge. Without them, you don’t just lack truth; you lose what distinguishes human action from animal reaction. It’s philosophy as a rebuttal to the tyranny of “works for me,” delivered with patrician contempt.
The comparison to “empirical physicians” sharpens the blade. In Leibniz’s era, medicine was split between craft knowledge (what seemed to work) and emerging theoretical systems trying to explain why. He’s not dismissing experience; he’s mocking experience without a conceptual scaffold. The “mere practice without theory” line reads like a critique of intellectual complacency: you can accumulate cases, anecdotes, and routines and still never rise to understanding. You become competent, even effective, while remaining blind.
Subtextually, Leibniz is defending his larger project against rivals like Locke and the more associationist strains of empiricism: the mind isn’t just a storehouse of remembered sensations. There are principles - innate structures, rational relations, “reasons” - that organize perception into knowledge. Without them, you don’t just lack truth; you lose what distinguishes human action from animal reaction. It’s philosophy as a rebuttal to the tyranny of “works for me,” delivered with patrician contempt.
Quote Details
| Topic | Reason & Logic |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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