"Not that the propositions of geometry are only approximately true, but that they remain absolutely true in regard to that Euclidean space which has been so long regarded as being the physical space of our experience"
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Cayley is doing something sly: he’s defending geometry’s ironclad certainty while quietly cutting its tether to the world. The line pivots on a distinction that sounds pedantic until you feel the shockwave it carries. Geometry’s propositions aren’t “approximately true” the way a measurement is off by a millimeter; they’re “absolutely true” inside a specified arena: Euclidean space. The escape hatch is in that clause. If Euclidean space is no longer “the physical space of our experience,” nothing is wrong with geometry; what changes is which geometry physics should borrow.
That’s the 19th-century crisis behind the calm prose. Non-Euclidean geometries had already shown that Euclid’s parallel postulate wasn’t destiny, just a choice. Cayley, a key architect of modern algebra and projective geometry, is arguing for a clean separation: mathematics as a system of internally consistent structures, physics as the empirical business of deciding which structure models reality well. The subtext is almost political. Don’t blame math when nature stops cooperating with your intuitions.
It’s also a preemptive strike against a familiar anxiety: if multiple geometries exist, doesn’t that make mathematical truth mushy? Cayley’s answer is bracingly modern: truth in mathematics is conditional but not weakened; it’s absolute relative to axioms. The real demotion happens to “our experience,” which loses its old privilege as the unchallenged referee of spatial meaning.
That’s the 19th-century crisis behind the calm prose. Non-Euclidean geometries had already shown that Euclid’s parallel postulate wasn’t destiny, just a choice. Cayley, a key architect of modern algebra and projective geometry, is arguing for a clean separation: mathematics as a system of internally consistent structures, physics as the empirical business of deciding which structure models reality well. The subtext is almost political. Don’t blame math when nature stops cooperating with your intuitions.
It’s also a preemptive strike against a familiar anxiety: if multiple geometries exist, doesn’t that make mathematical truth mushy? Cayley’s answer is bracingly modern: truth in mathematics is conditional but not weakened; it’s absolute relative to axioms. The real demotion happens to “our experience,” which loses its old privilege as the unchallenged referee of spatial meaning.
Quote Details
| Topic | Truth |
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