"Nuclear deterrence doesn't work outside of the Russian - U.S. context; Saddam Hussein showed that"
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Horner’s line is a soldier’s blunt corrective to a tidy theory. Nuclear deterrence, in the textbook U.S.-Soviet version, depends on symmetry: two superpowers with second-strike capability, mature command-and-control, and a shared fear of apocalypse that keeps hotheads on a leash. His intent is to puncture the assumption that this logic scales neatly to every regime and every crisis.
The Saddam Hussein reference is doing the heavy lifting. Subtext: Iraq’s behavior exposed how deterrence can fail when the adversary misreads signals, doubts resolve, or thinks the rules are different for them. Saddam repeatedly acted as if he could weather confrontation through bluff, opacity, and a reputation for ruthlessness. He treated risk as a bargaining chip, not a boundary. In that world, nuclear weapons don’t automatically create stability; they can create a fog where misperception thrives and worst-case planning becomes policy.
There’s also an implicit critique of Western strategic comfort. The Russian-U.S. context was a highly ritualized relationship with backchannels, arms-control verification, and an almost bureaucratic familiarity with escalation ladders. Horner is warning that policymakers who cling to that model may underestimate actors who lack the same institutions, incentives, or strategic literacy. “Doesn’t work” here isn’t a claim that fear disappears; it’s that fear doesn’t reliably translate into predictable restraint.
Coming from a soldier, the line carries operational impatience: lives depend on not confusing theory with the messy psychology of regimes, especially those built on personalist power, paranoia, and the need to project defiance.
The Saddam Hussein reference is doing the heavy lifting. Subtext: Iraq’s behavior exposed how deterrence can fail when the adversary misreads signals, doubts resolve, or thinks the rules are different for them. Saddam repeatedly acted as if he could weather confrontation through bluff, opacity, and a reputation for ruthlessness. He treated risk as a bargaining chip, not a boundary. In that world, nuclear weapons don’t automatically create stability; they can create a fog where misperception thrives and worst-case planning becomes policy.
There’s also an implicit critique of Western strategic comfort. The Russian-U.S. context was a highly ritualized relationship with backchannels, arms-control verification, and an almost bureaucratic familiarity with escalation ladders. Horner is warning that policymakers who cling to that model may underestimate actors who lack the same institutions, incentives, or strategic literacy. “Doesn’t work” here isn’t a claim that fear disappears; it’s that fear doesn’t reliably translate into predictable restraint.
Coming from a soldier, the line carries operational impatience: lives depend on not confusing theory with the messy psychology of regimes, especially those built on personalist power, paranoia, and the need to project defiance.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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