"Our most tragic error may have been our inability to establish a rapport and a confidence with the press and television with the communication media. I don't think the press has understood me"
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Johnson’s complaint lands with the weary clang of a man who thought power was supposed to include the power to be understood. Coming from a president who mastered backroom persuasion and legislative arm-twisting, the line exposes a blind spot: the media age doesn’t reward mastery of corridors; it rewards mastery of camera grammar.
The specific intent is defensive but also diagnostic. Johnson isn’t merely griping about bad coverage; he’s naming “rapport” and “confidence” as strategic assets he failed to secure. That’s an admission that policy achievements and private cajoling were no longer enough. Television and the modern press weren’t just messengers; they had become validators. Without their trust, his story about Vietnam, the Great Society, or his own character would arrive pre-skeptical, filtered through doubt.
The subtext is more revealing: “I don’t think the press has understood me” is less about misunderstanding than control. Johnson frames the problem as interpretive failure on their end, not credibility failure on his. Yet the era’s central rupture was credibility. The Vietnam “credibility gap,” the sense that official optimism was performative, taught reporters to read presidential assurance as a tactic. Johnson’s yearning for rapport is also a longing for an older political bargain: deference in exchange for access. The press was exiting that arrangement, and television made the exit visible.
Context sharpens the tragedy he invokes. This is a president whose domestic legacy could have been singular, but whose war became the lens through which everything else was viewed. Johnson’s lament isn’t just about media relations; it’s about a presidency discovering that persuasion, without trust, looks like manipulation on the nightly news.
The specific intent is defensive but also diagnostic. Johnson isn’t merely griping about bad coverage; he’s naming “rapport” and “confidence” as strategic assets he failed to secure. That’s an admission that policy achievements and private cajoling were no longer enough. Television and the modern press weren’t just messengers; they had become validators. Without their trust, his story about Vietnam, the Great Society, or his own character would arrive pre-skeptical, filtered through doubt.
The subtext is more revealing: “I don’t think the press has understood me” is less about misunderstanding than control. Johnson frames the problem as interpretive failure on their end, not credibility failure on his. Yet the era’s central rupture was credibility. The Vietnam “credibility gap,” the sense that official optimism was performative, taught reporters to read presidential assurance as a tactic. Johnson’s yearning for rapport is also a longing for an older political bargain: deference in exchange for access. The press was exiting that arrangement, and television made the exit visible.
Context sharpens the tragedy he invokes. This is a president whose domestic legacy could have been singular, but whose war became the lens through which everything else was viewed. Johnson’s lament isn’t just about media relations; it’s about a presidency discovering that persuasion, without trust, looks like manipulation on the nightly news.
Quote Details
| Topic | Leadership |
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