"Our policy for the last many years has been to deter the Chinese government in Beijing from ever coming into the position where they thought they had enough leverage over the U.S. to cross the Straits of Taiwan"
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The phrase “our policy for the last many years” does quiet but important work: it frames deterrence not as a choice but as inherited orthodoxy, the kind of long-running consensus Washington prefers to present as natural law. Filner’s intent is to normalize a hard-edged posture toward Beijing by anchoring it in continuity. If the policy is longstanding, the implication goes, it must be prudent.
Then comes the psychological pivot: “from ever coming into the position where they thought they had enough leverage.” Deterrence here isn’t just about ships, missiles, or treaties; it’s about managing China’s perception of its own power. Filner describes a strategy aimed at preventing a moment of confidence, not merely a military capability. The subtext is a familiar superpower anxiety: that miscalculation begins when the rival believes the U.S. is distracted, divided, or bluffing.
The wording also reveals how Taiwan is often rhetorically treated in American politics: less as a self-governing democracy with its own agency and more as the terrain on which credibility is tested. “Cross the Straits of Taiwan” is a euphemism that softens what it actually denotes - invasion, war, catastrophe - while still conjuring a clear red line. It’s meant to be understood by defense-minded listeners without saying the loudest part out loud.
Contextually, Filner is speaking from the post-Cold War, pre-Ukraine era when “strategic ambiguity” and deterrence-by-dominance were Washington’s preferred tools. The sentence encapsulates that era’s bargain: keep Beijing uncertain, keep Taipei secure, keep the U.S. unquestioned.
Then comes the psychological pivot: “from ever coming into the position where they thought they had enough leverage.” Deterrence here isn’t just about ships, missiles, or treaties; it’s about managing China’s perception of its own power. Filner describes a strategy aimed at preventing a moment of confidence, not merely a military capability. The subtext is a familiar superpower anxiety: that miscalculation begins when the rival believes the U.S. is distracted, divided, or bluffing.
The wording also reveals how Taiwan is often rhetorically treated in American politics: less as a self-governing democracy with its own agency and more as the terrain on which credibility is tested. “Cross the Straits of Taiwan” is a euphemism that softens what it actually denotes - invasion, war, catastrophe - while still conjuring a clear red line. It’s meant to be understood by defense-minded listeners without saying the loudest part out loud.
Contextually, Filner is speaking from the post-Cold War, pre-Ukraine era when “strategic ambiguity” and deterrence-by-dominance were Washington’s preferred tools. The sentence encapsulates that era’s bargain: keep Beijing uncertain, keep Taipei secure, keep the U.S. unquestioned.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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