"So the - the part of the problem is not just the rhetoric. It's the fact that we - we're so polarized in what we've done to each other as parties over the last thirty years in redistricting that it's very, very hard to overcome your own constituencies and move to the middle"
About this Quote
Dean is pointing at the quiet machinery beneath America’s loudest shouting: you can clean up the “rhetoric” and still be trapped by the map. The stutters and self-corrections in his phrasing (“we - we’re”) aren’t just verbal clutter; they signal a politician trying to describe a system that feels both collective and culpable. He doesn’t blame one side. He says “we… to each other,” a deliberately mutual indictment that frames polarization as something engineered, not merely felt.
The key move is his pivot from culture-war heat to procedural design. By naming redistricting as a thirty-year project, Dean situates today’s gridlock in a bipartisan arms race of incumbent protection: districts carved to produce safe seats, which produce primaries, which produce lawmakers terrified of being “outflanked” rather than out-argued. In that ecosystem, “moving to the middle” isn’t a moral choice, it’s an electoral hazard.
His most revealing word is “constituencies.” It’s not “voters” in the abstract; it’s the specific coalition you’ve been optimized to serve, the one that can end your career with a low-turnout challenge. The subtext is fatalistic but strategic: moderation is not mainly a personality trait, it’s an incentive structure. Dean’s intent is to reframe political dysfunction as a design problem with designers - parties, consultants, legislators - and therefore, at least in theory, with fixable levers. The implied question isn’t “Why can’t they compromise?” It’s “Why would they, when the system punishes it?”
The key move is his pivot from culture-war heat to procedural design. By naming redistricting as a thirty-year project, Dean situates today’s gridlock in a bipartisan arms race of incumbent protection: districts carved to produce safe seats, which produce primaries, which produce lawmakers terrified of being “outflanked” rather than out-argued. In that ecosystem, “moving to the middle” isn’t a moral choice, it’s an electoral hazard.
His most revealing word is “constituencies.” It’s not “voters” in the abstract; it’s the specific coalition you’ve been optimized to serve, the one that can end your career with a low-turnout challenge. The subtext is fatalistic but strategic: moderation is not mainly a personality trait, it’s an incentive structure. Dean’s intent is to reframe political dysfunction as a design problem with designers - parties, consultants, legislators - and therefore, at least in theory, with fixable levers. The implied question isn’t “Why can’t they compromise?” It’s “Why would they, when the system punishes it?”
Quote Details
| Topic | Justice |
|---|
More Quotes by Howard
Add to List


