"Terrorists continue to exploit divisions between law enforcement and the intelligence communities that limit the sharing of vital counterterrorism information"
About this Quote
“Terrorists” is the villain in the foreground, but the real target here is a bureaucracy that can’t get out of its own way. Sensenbrenner’s line is crafted to make a technical problem feel like a moral emergency: if “vital” information isn’t shared, the failure isn’t just procedural, it’s existential. The verb “exploit” is doing heavy lifting. It frames interagency friction not as a domestic management issue but as an active weapon in an enemy’s hands, turning internal disagreements into external vulnerability.
The specific intent is legislative pressure. Sensenbrenner, a longtime Capitol Hill operator associated with tough-on-crime and post-9/11 security politics, isn’t merely diagnosing a snag; he’s building the case for reforms that force cooperation: standardized protocols, broader authorities, and fewer institutional veto points. “Divisions” is a polite word for turf wars, liability fears, and competing cultures of secrecy - police work built for courtrooms versus intelligence work built for sources and methods. By blaming the gap between “law enforcement” and “the intelligence communities,” he implies the obstacle is structural, not ideological, and therefore fixable by policy.
The subtext is also a rebuke: if another attack happens, look first at the system’s silos, not at a lack of resources or will. In the post-9/11 and ongoing homeland security context, that’s a familiar political move - convert complexity into a mandate. The line works because it collapses an unglamorous coordination problem into a simple story of prevention, urgency, and culpability.
The specific intent is legislative pressure. Sensenbrenner, a longtime Capitol Hill operator associated with tough-on-crime and post-9/11 security politics, isn’t merely diagnosing a snag; he’s building the case for reforms that force cooperation: standardized protocols, broader authorities, and fewer institutional veto points. “Divisions” is a polite word for turf wars, liability fears, and competing cultures of secrecy - police work built for courtrooms versus intelligence work built for sources and methods. By blaming the gap between “law enforcement” and “the intelligence communities,” he implies the obstacle is structural, not ideological, and therefore fixable by policy.
The subtext is also a rebuke: if another attack happens, look first at the system’s silos, not at a lack of resources or will. In the post-9/11 and ongoing homeland security context, that’s a familiar political move - convert complexity into a mandate. The line works because it collapses an unglamorous coordination problem into a simple story of prevention, urgency, and culpability.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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