"The attitude of physiological psychology to sensations and feelings, considered as psychical elements, is, naturally, the attitude of psychology at large"
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Wundt is doing something deceptively political here: he’s annexing the mind. By claiming that physiological psychology’s stance toward sensations and feelings is “naturally” the stance of psychology “at large,” he’s not merely describing a consensus. He’s trying to manufacture one. The word “naturally” is the pressure point - a rhetorical sleight of hand that turns a methodological preference into an inevitability, as if the discipline could only mature by adopting the lab’s posture toward inner life.
Context matters. In late 19th-century Germany, psychology was fighting for legitimacy as a science rather than a branch of philosophy or a cousin of introspective speculation. Wundt’s Leipzig lab (often treated as psychology’s institutional birth certificate) depended on a workable compromise: keep “sensations and feelings” as the basic units of consciousness, but treat them with the rigor of measurement, experiment, and physiological constraint. That’s what “psychical elements” signals - experience broken into components that can be tracked, timed, and compared.
The subtext is disciplinary boundary-setting. Wundt is warning that if psychology wants a seat at the scientific table, it can’t treat feelings as ineffable mysteries; they must be analyzed as lawful phenomena with correlates in the body. At the same time, he’s implicitly narrowing what counts as real psychological knowledge: not the messy narrative self, not meaning, not culture, but the smallest measurable bricks of experience.
It works because it sounds modest - just an alignment of attitudes - while quietly redefining psychology’s center of gravity around the laboratory.
Context matters. In late 19th-century Germany, psychology was fighting for legitimacy as a science rather than a branch of philosophy or a cousin of introspective speculation. Wundt’s Leipzig lab (often treated as psychology’s institutional birth certificate) depended on a workable compromise: keep “sensations and feelings” as the basic units of consciousness, but treat them with the rigor of measurement, experiment, and physiological constraint. That’s what “psychical elements” signals - experience broken into components that can be tracked, timed, and compared.
The subtext is disciplinary boundary-setting. Wundt is warning that if psychology wants a seat at the scientific table, it can’t treat feelings as ineffable mysteries; they must be analyzed as lawful phenomena with correlates in the body. At the same time, he’s implicitly narrowing what counts as real psychological knowledge: not the messy narrative self, not meaning, not culture, but the smallest measurable bricks of experience.
It works because it sounds modest - just an alignment of attitudes - while quietly redefining psychology’s center of gravity around the laboratory.
Quote Details
| Topic | Deep |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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