"The German Air Force was not sufficient to protect the sea crossing on its own. While the leading part of the forces might have landed, there was the danger that they might be cut off from supplies and reinforcements"
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A soldier’s most damning critique often comes dressed as logistics. Von Rundstedt isn’t moralizing about ambition or warning against hubris; he’s doing something colder and, in its way, more subversive: puncturing the fantasy that air power could substitute for maritime reality. The phrasing is measured, almost bureaucratic, yet the verdict is brutal. “Not sufficient” and “danger” are the language of staff meetings, but here they carry the weight of an indictment.
The context is Germany’s recurring temptation in 1940-41 to imagine a decisive sea crossing under the Luftwaffe’s umbrella (most famously the mooted invasion of Britain, and later, broader debates about amphibious reach). Von Rundstedt, a senior commander with a traditional army officer’s suspicion of improvisation, is warning that even a successful first wave can become a trap. He highlights the asymmetry that kills invasions: landing troops is an event; sustaining them is a system. Air cover might shield a moment. It can’t reliably move fuel, artillery ammunition, spare parts, and replacements at the scale required while contested waters and enemy navies remain in play.
The subtext is internal politics as much as tactics. Von Rundstedt is implicitly pushing back against Hitler’s gambler’s instinct and the Luftwaffe’s overconfidence. By conceding “the leading part... might have landed,” he grants the optimists their opening scene, then cuts to the ending: isolation, attrition, and surrender. It’s a professional warning that also reads like a quiet refusal to be complicit in a catastrophic narrative.
The context is Germany’s recurring temptation in 1940-41 to imagine a decisive sea crossing under the Luftwaffe’s umbrella (most famously the mooted invasion of Britain, and later, broader debates about amphibious reach). Von Rundstedt, a senior commander with a traditional army officer’s suspicion of improvisation, is warning that even a successful first wave can become a trap. He highlights the asymmetry that kills invasions: landing troops is an event; sustaining them is a system. Air cover might shield a moment. It can’t reliably move fuel, artillery ammunition, spare parts, and replacements at the scale required while contested waters and enemy navies remain in play.
The subtext is internal politics as much as tactics. Von Rundstedt is implicitly pushing back against Hitler’s gambler’s instinct and the Luftwaffe’s overconfidence. By conceding “the leading part... might have landed,” he grants the optimists their opening scene, then cuts to the ending: isolation, attrition, and surrender. It’s a professional warning that also reads like a quiet refusal to be complicit in a catastrophic narrative.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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