"The history of the last century shows, as we shall see later, that the advice given to governments by bankers, like the advice they gave to industrialists, was consistently good for bankers, but was often disastrous for governments, businessmen, and the people generally"
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Quigley’s sentence is engineered to sound like a calmly filed brief while smuggling in an indictment. The key move is his double “like”: advice to governments, like advice to industrialists. That symmetry turns what could be dismissed as a one-off scandal into a pattern, almost a business model. The line doesn’t need melodrama because its moral math is stark: “consistently good for bankers” versus “often disastrous” for everyone else. “Consistently” is the tell. It suggests not occasional self-interest but reliability, the kind you’d expect from a system with incentives aligned and accountability misdirected.
The subtext isn’t merely that bankers are greedy; it’s that governments and industry repeatedly outsource judgment to a class whose success metrics are private, not civic. Quigley is pointing to a structural asymmetry: when financial advice succeeds, bankers profit; when it fails, the losses can be socialized across states, firms, and citizens. That’s a critique of expertise as power - not the crude claim that bankers secretly rule, but the sharper implication that policy and enterprise can become downstream of credit conditions, debt terms, and the priorities of those who set them.
Context matters: Quigley, a mid-century historian of elite institutions, is writing in the long shadow of war finance, central banking ascendance, and the post-1929 reordering of economic governance. “As we shall see later” is a professor’s throat-clear, but it also signals confidence: he’s not offering a hot take, he’s promising receipts. The intent is to reframe “sound finance” as an interest-bearing ideology - persuasive precisely because it masquerades as neutral competence.
The subtext isn’t merely that bankers are greedy; it’s that governments and industry repeatedly outsource judgment to a class whose success metrics are private, not civic. Quigley is pointing to a structural asymmetry: when financial advice succeeds, bankers profit; when it fails, the losses can be socialized across states, firms, and citizens. That’s a critique of expertise as power - not the crude claim that bankers secretly rule, but the sharper implication that policy and enterprise can become downstream of credit conditions, debt terms, and the priorities of those who set them.
Context matters: Quigley, a mid-century historian of elite institutions, is writing in the long shadow of war finance, central banking ascendance, and the post-1929 reordering of economic governance. “As we shall see later” is a professor’s throat-clear, but it also signals confidence: he’s not offering a hot take, he’s promising receipts. The intent is to reframe “sound finance” as an interest-bearing ideology - persuasive precisely because it masquerades as neutral competence.
Quote Details
| Topic | Money |
|---|---|
| Source | Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time, Carroll Quigley, 1966 — passage on bankers' advice appears in Quigley's discussion of finance and international banking in this book. |
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