"The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis"
About this Quote
The intent is methodological. Alexander, writing in an era when psychology was trying to model itself after the hard sciences and reflex theory was the prestige language of the nervous system, insists that the first-person "mental act" doesn’t neatly map onto the third-person chain of stimuli and responses. A reflex can be described as wiring, but the lived moment of sensation-as-impulse is not a component you can hold still. It’s a threshold event.
The subtext has teeth: reductionism wins on explanation and loses on what it claims to explain. If you treat sensation purely as an input and movement as an output, you may get a useful diagram while quietly excluding the very phenomenon called "mental". Alexander’s line also guards against overconfident introspection. The "simplicity" here is not transparency; it’s immediacy. Reflexes happen before the mind can narrate them, and that temporal fact becomes a philosophical argument about why some mental life resists being dissected without being distorted.
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APA Style (7th ed.)
Alexander, Samuel. (2026, January 17). The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis. FixQuotes. https://fixquotes.com/quotes/the-mental-act-of-sensation-which-issues-in-71394/
Chicago Style
Alexander, Samuel. "The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis." FixQuotes. January 17, 2026. https://fixquotes.com/quotes/the-mental-act-of-sensation-which-issues-in-71394/.
MLA Style (9th ed.)
"The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis." FixQuotes, 17 Jan. 2026, https://fixquotes.com/quotes/the-mental-act-of-sensation-which-issues-in-71394/. Accessed 21 Feb. 2026.





