"The mistake that was made was, of course, leaving Saddam in charge of affairs over there"
About this Quote
“Of course” is doing the dirty work here. John Dingell, a master of congressional plain talk, uses that little phrase to frame a sprawling geopolitical catastrophe as a commonsense oversight - not a tragic unknowable, not a high-minded “unintended consequence,” but an error so obvious it barely deserves debate. The line compresses years of policy into the language of a committee-room correction: we knew better, we didn’t do it, and now we’re living with the bill.
The intent is less to litigate Saddam Hussein’s character than to indict Washington’s appetite for half-measures. Dingell is pointing at the post-Gulf War settlement, when the U.S. stopped short of toppling Saddam in 1991, leaving a dictator boxed in by sanctions, periodically bombed, and still powerful enough to brutalize opponents and destabilize the region. That choice became a political Rorschach test in the 2000s: critics of later intervention could still concede that the earlier endpoint was morally and strategically messy; hawks could weaponize the “unfinished business” narrative.
Subtext: accountability. Dingell isn’t just saying “Saddam was bad.” He’s saying the system that produced the decision - cautious presidents, risk-averse coalitions, a Congress that likes clarity only after the fact - prefers ambiguity until it can’t. The quote’s punch comes from its deceptively mild phrasing. It’s not a drumbeat for war so much as a scathing reminder that America often wants outcomes without owning the means, then acts surprised when history refuses to stay contained “over there.”
The intent is less to litigate Saddam Hussein’s character than to indict Washington’s appetite for half-measures. Dingell is pointing at the post-Gulf War settlement, when the U.S. stopped short of toppling Saddam in 1991, leaving a dictator boxed in by sanctions, periodically bombed, and still powerful enough to brutalize opponents and destabilize the region. That choice became a political Rorschach test in the 2000s: critics of later intervention could still concede that the earlier endpoint was morally and strategically messy; hawks could weaponize the “unfinished business” narrative.
Subtext: accountability. Dingell isn’t just saying “Saddam was bad.” He’s saying the system that produced the decision - cautious presidents, risk-averse coalitions, a Congress that likes clarity only after the fact - prefers ambiguity until it can’t. The quote’s punch comes from its deceptively mild phrasing. It’s not a drumbeat for war so much as a scathing reminder that America often wants outcomes without owning the means, then acts surprised when history refuses to stay contained “over there.”
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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