"The object of self-love is expressed in the term self; and every appetite of sense, and every particular affection of the heart, are equally interested or disinterested, because the objects of them all are equally self or somewhat else"
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Butler slips a quiet blade into one of the loudest arguments of his age: that humans are always, secretly, selfish. The phrasing looks like dense moral geometry, but the intent is practical and surgical. He’s trying to dismantle the Hobbesian mood of early modern Britain, where “self-interest” had become the grown-up explanation for everything from charity to politics. As a clergyman and moral philosopher, Butler needs room for genuine virtue without resorting to mushy piety. His move is to make “self-love” smaller by making it precise.
The subtext is a definitional trap. If self-love is simply desire for one’s own good, then it can’t automatically swallow every “appetite of sense” (hunger, pleasure, ambition) or “affection of the heart” (pity, loyalty, parental love). Those other impulses have their own objects, and Butler insists we should take them seriously on their own terms. A person can want someone else’s safety because they care about that person, not because they’re doing calculus on personal benefit. Calling that “selfish” isn’t insight; it’s semantic imperialism.
His most interesting twist is the line “equally interested or disinterested.” Butler’s arguing that many passions aren’t even trying to be moral; they’re just directed. Some aim at the self, some at “somewhat else.” The moral drama, then, isn’t whether we have non-selfish motives (we do), but how self-love governs, restrains, or harmonizes the whole unruly portfolio of desires. In that context, virtue becomes less a halo and more a kind of internal constitutional order.
The subtext is a definitional trap. If self-love is simply desire for one’s own good, then it can’t automatically swallow every “appetite of sense” (hunger, pleasure, ambition) or “affection of the heart” (pity, loyalty, parental love). Those other impulses have their own objects, and Butler insists we should take them seriously on their own terms. A person can want someone else’s safety because they care about that person, not because they’re doing calculus on personal benefit. Calling that “selfish” isn’t insight; it’s semantic imperialism.
His most interesting twist is the line “equally interested or disinterested.” Butler’s arguing that many passions aren’t even trying to be moral; they’re just directed. Some aim at the self, some at “somewhat else.” The moral drama, then, isn’t whether we have non-selfish motives (we do), but how self-love governs, restrains, or harmonizes the whole unruly portfolio of desires. In that context, virtue becomes less a halo and more a kind of internal constitutional order.
Quote Details
| Topic | Self-Love |
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