"The only objects of practical reason are therefore those of good and evil. For by the former is meant an object necessarily desired according to a principle of reason; by the latter one necessarily shunned, also according to a principle of reason"
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Kant is trying to pull morality out of the swamp of taste, impulse, and social fashion and bolt it to something harder: reason’s own architecture. In this line, “practical reason” isn’t the armchair kind that classifies concepts; it’s reason as a faculty that moves bodies, makes choices, generates “oughts.” Its “objects” are the targets it can legitimately aim at, and Kant’s provocation is that these targets are not pleasure, happiness, or even flourishing as such, but good and evil understood as rationally binding.
The phrasing “necessarily desired” and “necessarily shunned” is doing quiet but aggressive work. Kant isn’t describing what people happen to want (we clearly desire plenty of terrible things). He’s describing what a will committed to reason must will, on pain of contradiction. The necessity here is normative: if you accept reason’s authority, you’re already committed to treating certain ends as mandatory and others as forbidden.
That subtext is a rebuttal to moral sentimentalism and to any ethics that smuggles in “the good” as whatever satisfies us. Kant is also narrowing the field: practical reason doesn’t take orders from appetites, theology, or utilitarian calculus. It legislates. “According to a principle of reason” hints at the larger Kantian engine: maxims, universalizability, and the idea that moral law is self-imposed by rational agents rather than handed down by preference or power.
Historically, this sits in the Enlightenment project of grounding ethics without relying on tradition. It works rhetorically because it sounds almost administrative, then lands like a coup: morality isn’t an add-on to life; it’s what reason is for, once it steps off the page and into action.
The phrasing “necessarily desired” and “necessarily shunned” is doing quiet but aggressive work. Kant isn’t describing what people happen to want (we clearly desire plenty of terrible things). He’s describing what a will committed to reason must will, on pain of contradiction. The necessity here is normative: if you accept reason’s authority, you’re already committed to treating certain ends as mandatory and others as forbidden.
That subtext is a rebuttal to moral sentimentalism and to any ethics that smuggles in “the good” as whatever satisfies us. Kant is also narrowing the field: practical reason doesn’t take orders from appetites, theology, or utilitarian calculus. It legislates. “According to a principle of reason” hints at the larger Kantian engine: maxims, universalizability, and the idea that moral law is self-imposed by rational agents rather than handed down by preference or power.
Historically, this sits in the Enlightenment project of grounding ethics without relying on tradition. It works rhetorically because it sounds almost administrative, then lands like a coup: morality isn’t an add-on to life; it’s what reason is for, once it steps off the page and into action.
Quote Details
| Topic | Ethics & Morality |
|---|---|
| Source | Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten), 1785 — Section I (standard English translations render this passage in the opening argument on practical reason and the objects of good and evil). |
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