"The private interest of the individual would not be sufficiently provided for by reasonable and cool self-love alone; therefore the appetites and passions are placed within as a guard and further security, without which it would not be taken due care of"
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Butler’s move here is sly: he flatly denies that human beings are basically calculators. “Reasonable and cool self-love” sounds like the Enlightenment fantasy of a tidy inner economist, dutifully pursuing long-term welfare with measured restraint. Butler, a clergyman watching early modern Britain argue itself into moral theory, calls that bluff. If self-interest were left to reason alone, he suggests, we’d neglect ourselves. So nature installs “appetites and passions” as a kind of internal security system, an alarm bell that forces attention when reason dithers.
The intent is partly theological, partly psychological, and quietly political. Butler is defending a moral architecture in which emotion isn’t the enemy of virtue but one of its instruments. Passions aren’t embarrassing glitches; they’re functional safeguards. That’s a direct shot at the Hobbesian suspicion that desire is chaos needing containment, and at the more flattering idea that we naturally optimize our good if we just think clearly. Butler’s premise is darker and more compassionate: people are often too inert, too distracted, too prone to rationalize away their own needs. Hunger, fear, longing, pride - these are crude, yes, but they get results.
The subtext is also a warning to moralizers who treat passion as mere temptation. If passions “guard” private interest, then ethical life can’t be built on repression and pure reasoning. It has to account for the way humans actually move: by being pushed, pulled, and sometimes jolted into caring. Butler’s clerical realism lands like an early critique of today’s “just be disciplined” culture: even self-preservation needs a shove.
The intent is partly theological, partly psychological, and quietly political. Butler is defending a moral architecture in which emotion isn’t the enemy of virtue but one of its instruments. Passions aren’t embarrassing glitches; they’re functional safeguards. That’s a direct shot at the Hobbesian suspicion that desire is chaos needing containment, and at the more flattering idea that we naturally optimize our good if we just think clearly. Butler’s premise is darker and more compassionate: people are often too inert, too distracted, too prone to rationalize away their own needs. Hunger, fear, longing, pride - these are crude, yes, but they get results.
The subtext is also a warning to moralizers who treat passion as mere temptation. If passions “guard” private interest, then ethical life can’t be built on repression and pure reasoning. It has to account for the way humans actually move: by being pushed, pulled, and sometimes jolted into caring. Butler’s clerical realism lands like an early critique of today’s “just be disciplined” culture: even self-preservation needs a shove.
Quote Details
| Topic | Ethics & Morality |
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