"The real problem was not the troops; the real problem was that only the United States had the infrastructure to do the transport of troops with big planes, and then who will pay?"
About this Quote
Power, in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's telling, isn’t just who has the guns. It’s who has the cargo planes.
The line lands like a bureaucratic shrug, but it’s really an indictment of how international “will” gets quietly replaced by international logistics. He strips away the usual moral drama around interventions - bravery, hesitation, geopolitical principle - and points to the unglamorous chokepoint that decides everything: lift capacity. If only one country can move an army quickly, that country effectively holds a veto over what the world can do, even when everyone agrees something should be done.
The subtext is aimed at the comforting fiction of collective security. The UN can authorize missions; it can’t conjure airfields, transport fleets, maintenance crews, and supply chains. In the 1990s, especially after Somalia and during Rwanda and Bosnia, Boutros-Ghali was watching mandates expand while member states dodged the bill. “Who will pay?” is less a budgeting question than a moral exposure: governments like the legitimacy of multilateral action until the invoice arrives.
There’s also a delicate, diplomatic rebuke embedded here. The United States isn’t being blamed for having the infrastructure; it’s being marked as structurally indispensable. That dependence distorts decision-making in both directions: Washington can resent being the default mover, while others can hide behind its absence to justify inaction. The quote works because it turns a grand ideal - global responsibility - into a mundane constraint, showing how easily ethics get grounded by runway length and appropriations.
The line lands like a bureaucratic shrug, but it’s really an indictment of how international “will” gets quietly replaced by international logistics. He strips away the usual moral drama around interventions - bravery, hesitation, geopolitical principle - and points to the unglamorous chokepoint that decides everything: lift capacity. If only one country can move an army quickly, that country effectively holds a veto over what the world can do, even when everyone agrees something should be done.
The subtext is aimed at the comforting fiction of collective security. The UN can authorize missions; it can’t conjure airfields, transport fleets, maintenance crews, and supply chains. In the 1990s, especially after Somalia and during Rwanda and Bosnia, Boutros-Ghali was watching mandates expand while member states dodged the bill. “Who will pay?” is less a budgeting question than a moral exposure: governments like the legitimacy of multilateral action until the invoice arrives.
There’s also a delicate, diplomatic rebuke embedded here. The United States isn’t being blamed for having the infrastructure; it’s being marked as structurally indispensable. That dependence distorts decision-making in both directions: Washington can resent being the default mover, while others can hide behind its absence to justify inaction. The quote works because it turns a grand ideal - global responsibility - into a mundane constraint, showing how easily ethics get grounded by runway length and appropriations.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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