"The sensory acts are accordingly distinguished by their objects"
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A tidy, almost clinical line that smuggles in a whole philosophy of mind: Alexander wants you to stop treating sensation as a private glow inside the skull and start treating it as a way of being keyed to the world. “Sensory acts” aren’t sorted by some mysterious inner flavor; they’re “distinguished by their objects.” Seeing is seeing something colored and extended; hearing is hearing something resonant and temporal. The act gets its identity from what it reaches, not from a self-contained mental ingredient.
That framing matters in Alexander’s early-20th-century context, when British philosophy was wrestling with empiricism’s hangover and the rising influence of psychology. Introspection had made “sense-data” feel like the basic furniture of experience: little mental items we examine from the inside. Alexander, a leading figure in emergentist metaphysics, pushes against that inward turn. He tilts toward a more realist, outward-facing picture in which mind is not a theater but a set of relations: the sensory is defined by its intentional target.
The subtext is methodological, too. If you classify the senses by objects, you can treat perception as structurally continuous with the world it discloses. That helps Alexander later argue that higher features (life, mind, value) “emerge” from complex organization without becoming supernatural add-ons. The sentence reads modest, but it’s a quiet declaration of allegiance: the mind is intelligible only when you track what it’s about, not just how it feels.
That framing matters in Alexander’s early-20th-century context, when British philosophy was wrestling with empiricism’s hangover and the rising influence of psychology. Introspection had made “sense-data” feel like the basic furniture of experience: little mental items we examine from the inside. Alexander, a leading figure in emergentist metaphysics, pushes against that inward turn. He tilts toward a more realist, outward-facing picture in which mind is not a theater but a set of relations: the sensory is defined by its intentional target.
The subtext is methodological, too. If you classify the senses by objects, you can treat perception as structurally continuous with the world it discloses. That helps Alexander later argue that higher features (life, mind, value) “emerge” from complex organization without becoming supernatural add-ons. The sentence reads modest, but it’s a quiet declaration of allegiance: the mind is intelligible only when you track what it’s about, not just how it feels.
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| Topic | Truth |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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