"There is a tendency to seek an objective account of everything before admitting its reality"
About this Quote
Nagel is skewering a very modern kind of intellectual vanity: the impulse to treat reality like a claim that needs third-party verification before it can be allowed into the room. The line targets a prestige reflex in philosophy and science-adjacent culture, where “objective” becomes less a method than a moral credential. If something can’t be rendered from nowhere - stripped of perspective, emotion, embodiment, and first-person texture - it’s quietly demoted to “mere appearance,” “subjective,” or, worst of all, “not real.”
The intent is diagnostic, not anti-science. Nagel isn’t saying objectivity is bad; he’s warning that it can become a gatekeeping posture. Underneath is his long-running preoccupation with the limits of the “view from nowhere”: the aspiration to describe the world in a way that no particular creature, with no particular senses, could dispute. That aspiration does real work in physics. It starts to misfire when imported into consciousness, value, pain, or meaning - domains where the first-person perspective isn’t noise in the system but part of the phenomenon.
The subtext is a rebuke to reductionism’s etiquette. When we demand an “objective account” of, say, mental states before granting they’re real, we’re not being rigorous; we’re privileging a certain vocabulary (quantitative, third-person, publicly checkable) and mistaking its authority for ontology. Nagel’s sentence lands because it exposes the hidden bargain: we trade the messy reality we actually inhabit for a cleaner description, then pretend only the cleaned-up version counts.
The intent is diagnostic, not anti-science. Nagel isn’t saying objectivity is bad; he’s warning that it can become a gatekeeping posture. Underneath is his long-running preoccupation with the limits of the “view from nowhere”: the aspiration to describe the world in a way that no particular creature, with no particular senses, could dispute. That aspiration does real work in physics. It starts to misfire when imported into consciousness, value, pain, or meaning - domains where the first-person perspective isn’t noise in the system but part of the phenomenon.
The subtext is a rebuke to reductionism’s etiquette. When we demand an “objective account” of, say, mental states before granting they’re real, we’re not being rigorous; we’re privileging a certain vocabulary (quantitative, third-person, publicly checkable) and mistaking its authority for ontology. Nagel’s sentence lands because it exposes the hidden bargain: we trade the messy reality we actually inhabit for a cleaner description, then pretend only the cleaned-up version counts.
Quote Details
| Topic | Truth |
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