"To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced"
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Radical empiricism is James doing something sly: tightening the scientific screws until they pop out in unexpected places. He’s not arguing for a thinner view of reality, the lab-coat version that only trusts what can be measured. He’s arguing for a stricter honesty about experience - and that strictness ends up making reality feel thicker. The line’s double demand is the whole trick. Don’t smuggle in metaphysical “extras” (souls, essences, hidden substrates) to patch holes in your model. But also don’t quietly throw away what you actually live through just because it’s messy: relations, continuities, meanings, feelings of connection, the sense that one thing leads to another.
The subtext is a rebuke to two rivals at once. Against rationalists and idealists, James refuses grand explanatory machinery that floats above life. Against the hard-nosed empiricists of his era - and the emerging prestige of mechanistic science - he refuses the habit of pretending that only discrete “sense data” count as real. If you experience “togetherness,” “aboutness,” or causation as lived sequence, those aren’t embarrassing subjective add-ons; they’re part of the data set.
Context matters: late 19th-century psychology is being born, philosophy is wrestling with Darwin, and James is trying to keep philosophy answerable to life rather than to systems. The sentence reads like a rule, but it’s also a cultural posture: distrust the convenient abstractions, and defend the full, untidy richness of what shows up. It’s empiricism as anti-cheating - and as a quiet expansion of what we’re allowed to call real.
The subtext is a rebuke to two rivals at once. Against rationalists and idealists, James refuses grand explanatory machinery that floats above life. Against the hard-nosed empiricists of his era - and the emerging prestige of mechanistic science - he refuses the habit of pretending that only discrete “sense data” count as real. If you experience “togetherness,” “aboutness,” or causation as lived sequence, those aren’t embarrassing subjective add-ons; they’re part of the data set.
Context matters: late 19th-century psychology is being born, philosophy is wrestling with Darwin, and James is trying to keep philosophy answerable to life rather than to systems. The sentence reads like a rule, but it’s also a cultural posture: distrust the convenient abstractions, and defend the full, untidy richness of what shows up. It’s empiricism as anti-cheating - and as a quiet expansion of what we’re allowed to call real.
Quote Details
| Topic | Reason & Logic |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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