"To pretend, I actually do the thing: I have therefore only pretended to pretend"

To pretend is typically understood as to feign or simulate something, suggesting an action that does not coincide with reality. Jacques Derrida’s claim that to pretend, he actually does the thing, initiates a logical fold: if in pretending, the action is carried out, even under the guise of pretense, the boundary between genuine action and simulation begins to blur. The act of pretending does not merely reference a non-action; rather, it performs an action under the register of simulation. By stating “I have therefore only pretended to pretend,” Derrida unsettles the distinction between true action and mere representation.

The complexity emerges in the recursive structure of pretending. If pretending means to act as though, but "acting as though" is itself an action, then the performance cannot be purely illusory. The subject who pretends is involved in a real act, the pretense itself. When one claims to pretend to pretend, the possibility of pure simulation collapses, as even layers of pretense result in a genuine act on some level. The result is a paradox: all pretense contains the seeds of reality, because the gesture, even in its claim to fictionality or detachment, is actualized.

Derrida’s reflection participates in broader philosophical discussions about mimesis, authenticity, and the relation between sign and meaning. He challenges the secure limits between truth and falsity, presence and absence, by demonstrating how the very act of simulation reaffirms presence. The layers of pretending, instead of distancing experience from reality, envelop it within a performance that cannot escape the actuality of its own occurrence.

In the end, Derrida’s observation destabilizes the assurance of authenticity and simulation as opposites. Every act of pretending is an act in itself. Thus, the supposed barrier separating reality from pretense is shown to be contingent and unstable, inviting reconsideration of what it means to act, simulate, or even exist as a subject entangled in language and representation.