"Truth as such is not a particularly important concept in naturalistic philosophy"
About this Quote
The subtext is cultural as much as philosophical. Naturalism, in this framing, becomes less a method for investigating the world than a gatekeeping regime: it decides in advance what kinds of explanations are admissible, and then congratulates itself for staying “objective.” Johnson’s insinuation is that once you reduce knowledge to what can be cashed out in evolutionary usefulness, pragmatic success, or scientific consensus, you haven’t refuted truth; you’ve replaced it with something easier to manage: credibility, coherence, survival value.
Context matters because Johnson is widely associated with the intelligent design movement, and this sentence reads like an opening move in that larger argument. If naturalism can’t justify truth as a binding ideal, then its authority to rule out non-natural explanations starts to look less like rigor and more like preference dressed up as inevitability. The line works because it weaponizes a modest tone (“not particularly important”) to deliver a major indictment: a philosophy that can explain everything except why we should trust explanation itself.
Quote Details
| Topic | Truth |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
| Cite |
Citation Formats
APA Style (7th ed.)
Johnson, Phillip E. (2026, January 16). Truth as such is not a particularly important concept in naturalistic philosophy. FixQuotes. https://fixquotes.com/quotes/truth-as-such-is-not-a-particularly-important-97834/
Chicago Style
Johnson, Phillip E. "Truth as such is not a particularly important concept in naturalistic philosophy." FixQuotes. January 16, 2026. https://fixquotes.com/quotes/truth-as-such-is-not-a-particularly-important-97834/.
MLA Style (9th ed.)
"Truth as such is not a particularly important concept in naturalistic philosophy." FixQuotes, 16 Jan. 2026, https://fixquotes.com/quotes/truth-as-such-is-not-a-particularly-important-97834/. Accessed 11 Feb. 2026.












