"We all hoped in 2001 that we could put in place an Afghan government under President Karzai that would be able to control the country, make sure al-Qaeda didn't come back, and make sure the Taliban wasn't resurging. It didn't work out"
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Powell’s blunt coda - “It didn’t work out” - is doing more than summarizing a failed policy. It’s an intentionally flattened epitaph for an era of American confidence that treated state-building as a solvable engineering problem: install a central government, empower a respectable partner (Karzai), deny space to terrorists, suppress the insurgency. The sentence compresses years of contested choices into a single, almost managerial verdict, a rhetorical move that both owns the outcome and drains it of heat.
The context matters: 2001 wasn’t just a date, it was a mandate. After 9/11, the U.S. needed a narrative of control - not only over al-Qaeda, but over the conditions that supposedly produced it. Karzai became the embodiment of that story: a leader who could translate American aims into Afghan legitimacy. Powell frames this as “we all hoped,” spreading responsibility across a bipartisan, institutional consensus. That “we” is also a shield: the failure belongs to the system, not a lone decision-maker.
Subtext: the objectives were in tension from the start. “Control the country” implies a strong central state in a place with deep regional power structures. “Make sure al-Qaeda didn’t come back” hints at a narrow counterterrorism goal, while “make sure the Taliban wasn’t resurging” admits the political reality of an enemy that wasn’t simply a terrorist network but a durable insurgency with local roots and external sanctuaries. Powell’s choice to end on understatement signals a statesman’s preference for restraint - a quiet acknowledgement that the ambition exceeded the leverage.
The context matters: 2001 wasn’t just a date, it was a mandate. After 9/11, the U.S. needed a narrative of control - not only over al-Qaeda, but over the conditions that supposedly produced it. Karzai became the embodiment of that story: a leader who could translate American aims into Afghan legitimacy. Powell frames this as “we all hoped,” spreading responsibility across a bipartisan, institutional consensus. That “we” is also a shield: the failure belongs to the system, not a lone decision-maker.
Subtext: the objectives were in tension from the start. “Control the country” implies a strong central state in a place with deep regional power structures. “Make sure al-Qaeda didn’t come back” hints at a narrow counterterrorism goal, while “make sure the Taliban wasn’t resurging” admits the political reality of an enemy that wasn’t simply a terrorist network but a durable insurgency with local roots and external sanctuaries. Powell’s choice to end on understatement signals a statesman’s preference for restraint - a quiet acknowledgement that the ambition exceeded the leverage.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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