"We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element"
About this Quote
The subtext is methodological. If you build your theory by stipulating that every act includes both a cognitive and a conative element, you’ve insulated yourself from counterexamples: perception becomes secretly desire-tainted, desire becomes stealthily knowledge-laden, and nothing can ever be “just” attending, or “just” wanting. Alexander is saying: stop laundering complexity into a universal template. Let distinctions bite. Some mental episodes may be primarily cognitive; others are conative through and through. Mixing them by default isn’t nuance - it’s a category error dressed up as depth.
Contextually, Alexander sits in an era trying to reconcile introspective psychology with more rigorous philosophical analysis, while his own metaphysical project (emergent evolution) pushes him to treat mind as layered and differentiated rather than reducible to a single formula. The sentence’s power is its austerity: he uses a mild “cannot” to do something aggressive - deny a reigning schema and force the reader to justify, not assume, the mind’s supposed internal dualism.
Quote Details
| Topic | Reason & Logic |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
| Cite |
Citation Formats
APA Style (7th ed.)
Alexander, Samuel. (2026, January 17). We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element. FixQuotes. https://fixquotes.com/quotes/we-cannot-therefore-say-that-mental-acts-contain-71395/
Chicago Style
Alexander, Samuel. "We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element." FixQuotes. January 17, 2026. https://fixquotes.com/quotes/we-cannot-therefore-say-that-mental-acts-contain-71395/.
MLA Style (9th ed.)
"We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element." FixQuotes, 17 Jan. 2026, https://fixquotes.com/quotes/we-cannot-therefore-say-that-mental-acts-contain-71395/. Accessed 12 Feb. 2026.




