"We need to defeat al Queda and other terrorist organizations"
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The blunt force of “We need to defeat al Queda and other terrorist organizations” is the point: it’s a line engineered for consensus, not nuance. Cellucci, a mainstream Republican governor-turned-diplomat, isn’t trying to innovate rhetorically; he’s trying to seal a political container around fear and purpose. “We need” turns a policy preference into a civic obligation, a small grammatical move that recruits the listener into responsibility. “Defeat” is totalizing and elastic: it promises finality while leaving the methods conveniently unspecified, a word that can cover everything from intelligence sharing to invasions without litigating trade-offs.
The subtext is as important as the target. “Al Queda” (misspelled as it’s often rendered in casual political speech) functions less as a precise entity than as a symbol of the post-9/11 threat environment. The phrase “and other terrorist organizations” widens the aperture to permanence. It implies an enemy ecosystem rather than a discrete foe, which helps justify open-ended authorities, budgets, and alliances. It also neatly sidesteps harder questions: What counts as “terrorist”? Who decides? What collateral costs are acceptable?
Contextually, this is the language of the early War on Terror era, when officials needed to project resolve, reassure a rattled public, and avoid appearing partisan in the face of national trauma. It works because it’s morally uncomplicated on the surface while structurally built to support complicated, long-duration policy underneath.
The subtext is as important as the target. “Al Queda” (misspelled as it’s often rendered in casual political speech) functions less as a precise entity than as a symbol of the post-9/11 threat environment. The phrase “and other terrorist organizations” widens the aperture to permanence. It implies an enemy ecosystem rather than a discrete foe, which helps justify open-ended authorities, budgets, and alliances. It also neatly sidesteps harder questions: What counts as “terrorist”? Who decides? What collateral costs are acceptable?
Contextually, this is the language of the early War on Terror era, when officials needed to project resolve, reassure a rattled public, and avoid appearing partisan in the face of national trauma. It works because it’s morally uncomplicated on the surface while structurally built to support complicated, long-duration policy underneath.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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