"Well, Mr. Speaker, if so many of these Iraqis are ready to come up and to provide the security, the police work in the country, then surely there should be no problem with putting American forces into the background instead of having them up front"
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Meehan’s line is a neat piece of congressional jiu-jitsu: it accepts the rosy premise being sold about Iraqi readiness, then uses that premise to corner its advocates. The “Well, Mr. Speaker” framing matters. This isn’t barroom skepticism; it’s skepticism stamped with institutional authority, aimed as much at colleagues and the public record as at the policy itself.
The sentence is built like a trap. “If so many of these Iraqis are ready” borrows the administration’s talking point without endorsing it, then pivots to “surely,” a word that sounds reasonable while quietly accusing the other side of bad faith. If Iraqi forces can “provide the security, the police work,” why are American troops still “up front”? The implication is that the U.S. is either overstating Iraqi capacity for political cover, or keeping Americans in the most exposed role because Iraqi institutions aren’t actually prepared. Either way, someone is selling confidence they don’t have to cash.
The subtext is also about ownership of risk. “Up front” vs. “into the background” isn’t just battlefield geometry; it’s moral accounting. Who absorbs the casualties, who gets credited for “progress,” who controls the coercive apparatus of the state. Meehan’s phrasing presses on the contradiction at the heart of occupation-era rhetoric: promising sovereignty while maintaining dominance.
Contextually, it’s a critique of the “train and transfer” narrative during the Iraq War years, when benchmarks of local capacity were constantly invoked to justify staying - and constantly deferred to explain why leaving was “not yet” possible. Meehan turns that elastic timeline into a testable demand.
The sentence is built like a trap. “If so many of these Iraqis are ready” borrows the administration’s talking point without endorsing it, then pivots to “surely,” a word that sounds reasonable while quietly accusing the other side of bad faith. If Iraqi forces can “provide the security, the police work,” why are American troops still “up front”? The implication is that the U.S. is either overstating Iraqi capacity for political cover, or keeping Americans in the most exposed role because Iraqi institutions aren’t actually prepared. Either way, someone is selling confidence they don’t have to cash.
The subtext is also about ownership of risk. “Up front” vs. “into the background” isn’t just battlefield geometry; it’s moral accounting. Who absorbs the casualties, who gets credited for “progress,” who controls the coercive apparatus of the state. Meehan’s phrasing presses on the contradiction at the heart of occupation-era rhetoric: promising sovereignty while maintaining dominance.
Contextually, it’s a critique of the “train and transfer” narrative during the Iraq War years, when benchmarks of local capacity were constantly invoked to justify staying - and constantly deferred to explain why leaving was “not yet” possible. Meehan turns that elastic timeline into a testable demand.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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