Book: On the Laws
Setting and Aim
Cicero’s On the Laws is a philosophical–political dialogue, composed in the early 50s BCE, staged at his villa in Arpinum with his brother Quintus and his friend Atticus. Designed as a companion to On the Republic, it moves from principle to prescription: from the nature and source of law to a sketch of institutions for an idealized Rome. Inspired by Plato’s Laws yet anchored in Roman tradition, Cicero proposes not a radical invention but a purification and codification of the mos maiorum under the guidance of reason and virtue. Only the first three books survive, and even they are incomplete; nevertheless they reveal a coherent program that unites metaphysics, civic religion, and constitutional design.
Law and Nature
Book I establishes the foundation. Law, Cicero argues, is not merely the command of a sovereign or the letter of a statute; it is the highest reason, implanted by nature, commanding what ought to be done and forbidding the contrary. This “true law” is universal, eternal, and unchanging because it flows from the divine mind that orders the cosmos. Positive enactments merit the name law only insofar as they participate in this right reason; unjust decrees and tyrannical edicts are, strictly speaking, not laws. Justice therefore precedes convention and does not depend on custom or utility alone. Humans share reason and sociability, and from that natural fellowship arises ius, the bond of right that links citizens and foreigners alike. The wise statesman is a philosopher–legislator who reads nature’s norms and translates them into civil provisions fit for the character of a people. Against relativists and legal positivists, Cicero maintains that the criterion of justice is rational and moral, not merely procedural.
Religion and Civic Rites (Book II)
Book II turns to sacred law as the keystone of civic order. Religion, rightly understood, educates citizens, disciplines desires, and aligns the city with divine providence. Cicero preserves the structure of Roman cult, pontiffs, augurs, auspices, festivals, vows, and the management of prodigies, while purging superstition and excess. Public rites must be orderly, public, and regulated by magistrates and priests; secret or foreign practices that unsettle civic harmony are restrained. Oaths bind because they invoke the gods as witnesses, and sacrilege is treated as a grave offense against both community and cosmos. Funerals and burials are modest and regulated to curb luxury and moral decay; burial within the city is restricted. By coordinating calendars, priestly jurisdictions, and ritual procedure, Cicero aims to make piety a public pedagogy, securing legitimacy for magistrates through auspices and giving law a sacred underpinning without abandoning rational scrutiny.
Constitution and Magistracies (Book III)
Book III sketches constitutional law for a mixed commonwealth. Authority is balanced among people, Senate, and magistrates, with the Senate’s counsel guiding policy and the people’s assemblies conferring office and enacting statutes. Consuls hold executive command bounded by law; praetors administer justice; aediles and quaestors manage civic and financial functions; censors uphold morals through the census and the nota; tribunes exist to protect citizens but are disciplined by law so that their power aids rather than unravels the state. Elections are structured to favor deliberation and character over demagogy, with measures against bribery and faction. The right of appeal shields citizens from arbitrary coercion, while accountability mechanisms call officeholders to account at the close of their terms. Throughout, Cicero subordinates institutional design to ethical purpose: magistracy is service, liberty is ordered by law, and stability arises from concord under reason.
Style, Sources, and Legacy
The dialogue blends Stoic-inflected natural law (via Panaetius and Posidonius) with Roman legal and religious tradition. Its imagined code would have extended to civil and criminal law in later, now-lost books, completing the passage from universal principles to detailed statutes. Even fragmentary, On the Laws became a touchstone for the natural law tradition, shaping medieval and early modern conceptions of lex as right reason and reinforcing the ideal that unjust statutes are not true laws. It stands as Cicero’s attempt to anchor Rome’s institutions in a moral cosmos and to make political order the practical expression of philosophical truth.
Cicero’s On the Laws is a philosophical–political dialogue, composed in the early 50s BCE, staged at his villa in Arpinum with his brother Quintus and his friend Atticus. Designed as a companion to On the Republic, it moves from principle to prescription: from the nature and source of law to a sketch of institutions for an idealized Rome. Inspired by Plato’s Laws yet anchored in Roman tradition, Cicero proposes not a radical invention but a purification and codification of the mos maiorum under the guidance of reason and virtue. Only the first three books survive, and even they are incomplete; nevertheless they reveal a coherent program that unites metaphysics, civic religion, and constitutional design.
Law and Nature
Book I establishes the foundation. Law, Cicero argues, is not merely the command of a sovereign or the letter of a statute; it is the highest reason, implanted by nature, commanding what ought to be done and forbidding the contrary. This “true law” is universal, eternal, and unchanging because it flows from the divine mind that orders the cosmos. Positive enactments merit the name law only insofar as they participate in this right reason; unjust decrees and tyrannical edicts are, strictly speaking, not laws. Justice therefore precedes convention and does not depend on custom or utility alone. Humans share reason and sociability, and from that natural fellowship arises ius, the bond of right that links citizens and foreigners alike. The wise statesman is a philosopher–legislator who reads nature’s norms and translates them into civil provisions fit for the character of a people. Against relativists and legal positivists, Cicero maintains that the criterion of justice is rational and moral, not merely procedural.
Religion and Civic Rites (Book II)
Book II turns to sacred law as the keystone of civic order. Religion, rightly understood, educates citizens, disciplines desires, and aligns the city with divine providence. Cicero preserves the structure of Roman cult, pontiffs, augurs, auspices, festivals, vows, and the management of prodigies, while purging superstition and excess. Public rites must be orderly, public, and regulated by magistrates and priests; secret or foreign practices that unsettle civic harmony are restrained. Oaths bind because they invoke the gods as witnesses, and sacrilege is treated as a grave offense against both community and cosmos. Funerals and burials are modest and regulated to curb luxury and moral decay; burial within the city is restricted. By coordinating calendars, priestly jurisdictions, and ritual procedure, Cicero aims to make piety a public pedagogy, securing legitimacy for magistrates through auspices and giving law a sacred underpinning without abandoning rational scrutiny.
Constitution and Magistracies (Book III)
Book III sketches constitutional law for a mixed commonwealth. Authority is balanced among people, Senate, and magistrates, with the Senate’s counsel guiding policy and the people’s assemblies conferring office and enacting statutes. Consuls hold executive command bounded by law; praetors administer justice; aediles and quaestors manage civic and financial functions; censors uphold morals through the census and the nota; tribunes exist to protect citizens but are disciplined by law so that their power aids rather than unravels the state. Elections are structured to favor deliberation and character over demagogy, with measures against bribery and faction. The right of appeal shields citizens from arbitrary coercion, while accountability mechanisms call officeholders to account at the close of their terms. Throughout, Cicero subordinates institutional design to ethical purpose: magistracy is service, liberty is ordered by law, and stability arises from concord under reason.
Style, Sources, and Legacy
The dialogue blends Stoic-inflected natural law (via Panaetius and Posidonius) with Roman legal and religious tradition. Its imagined code would have extended to civil and criminal law in later, now-lost books, completing the passage from universal principles to detailed statutes. Even fragmentary, On the Laws became a touchstone for the natural law tradition, shaping medieval and early modern conceptions of lex as right reason and reinforcing the ideal that unjust statutes are not true laws. It stands as Cicero’s attempt to anchor Rome’s institutions in a moral cosmos and to make political order the practical expression of philosophical truth.
On the Laws
Original Title: De Legibus
A dialogue on law, politics, and natural law, in which Cicero explores his ideas about the relationship between divine, cosmic, and human laws.
- Publication Year: -52
- Type: Book
- Genre: Philosophy, Law
- Language: Latin
- View all works by Cicero on Amazon
Author: Cicero

More about Cicero
- Occup.: Philosopher
- From: Rome
- Other works:
- On the Orator (-55 Book)
- The Republic (-54 Book)
- Brutus (-46 Book)
- Tusculan Disputations (-45 Book)
- On the Nature of the Gods (-45 Book)