Non-fiction: Plan of Attack

Overview
Plan of Attack traces the origins, debates and decisions that culminated in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Through extensive interviews, contemporaneous memoranda and meeting accounts, Bob Woodward reconstructs how the Bush administration moved from the 9/11 era's anxiety to a campaign to remove Saddam Hussein. The narrative follows policy discussions inside the White House, Pentagon planning, diplomatic maneuvering and the contested intelligence that was used to build a case for war.

Central narrative
The book follows a chronological arc that begins in the months after 9/11 and moves through the lead-up to the March 2003 invasion. Key turning points include the administration's adoption of a preventive-war posture, the sharpening of arguments that linked Iraq to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and the internal processes that converted strategic preference into operational plans. Woodward emphasizes the interplay of personalities and institutions, showing how decisions emerged from a mixture of political calculation, bureaucratic advocacy and intelligence assessment.

Key figures and debates
President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell occupy central positions in the account. The book depicts profound disagreements among top officials: Powell's insistence on rigorous intelligence standards and diplomatic legitimacy contrasted with advocates of a more aggressive posture who emphasized regime change and rapid military options. Condoleezza Rice and the vice president's office are shown shaping the strategic frame, while senior Pentagon officials and neoconservative voices pushed for a lighter, faster military approach.

Intelligence and justification
A crucial theme is the role and reliability of intelligence. Woodward describes how fragmentary, ambiguous and sometimes misleading pieces of evidence, ranging from alleged links to terrorist groups to contested weapons programs, were marshaled to justify military action. The book examines how intelligence was interpreted, amplified and presented to policymakers, and how competing readings were debated inside the administration. The result is a picture of confidence built on uncertain foundations, with diplomatic efforts and public persuasion following the intelligence-driven narrative.

Military planning and execution
Planning at the Pentagon and Central Command receives detailed attention, from contingency studies to the operational concept that became known as "shock and awe." Rumsfeld's insistence on smaller, more agile forces and a rapid collapse of Saddam's regime contrasts with concerns about postwar stability and occupation requirements. Woodward highlights the relative speed of military execution against the shortcomings in preparation for governance, security and reconstruction in Iraq after major combat operations ended.

Aftermath and implications
The book traces immediate consequences in policy and politics, including the strains on U.S. alliances, global public opinion and the administration's credibility when promised WMD were not found. It examines the costs of insufficient postwar planning and how early assumptions about a swift, uncomplicated transition to stability proved overly optimistic. The narrative invites reflection on the balance between preventive strategy and the practical demands of occupation and reconstruction.

Style and reception
Written in Woodward's signature narrative-reporting style, the account is rich in scene-setting, meeting detail and sourced dialogue. Reviewers praised the depth of reporting and the clarity of the institutional portrait, while some critics wished for stronger analytic judgment about the administration's choices. The book stands as a detailed chronicle of a pivotal policy decision, useful for readers seeking an inside look at how national security decisions are argued, decided and implemented at the highest levels.