Book: The Philosophical System of Thomas Reid

Overview
Victor Cousin presents a thorough and sympathetic exposition of Thomas Reid's philosophical position, situating Reid as a vital corrective to the skepticism that followed David Hume. The text clarifies Reid's method and doctrines, arguing that Reid restores confidence in human cognition by appealing to the self-evidence of certain common beliefs and to the natural operations of the mind. Emphasis falls on how Reid systematizes practical human thought, perception, memory, and conscience, into a coherent realist philosophy.
Cousin frames Reid not as a mere opponent of Hume, but as an independent thinker who advances an empirically grounded realism. Reid's approach is shown as both a psychological description of mental faculties and a metaphysical claim about the existence of an external world apprehended directly through those faculties. Cousin draws attention to Reid's clarity of expression and his commitment to philosophical modesty: accepting everyday convictions as philosophically foundational rather than suspecting them as illusions.

Reid and Common Sense
Reid's central tenet, as Cousin recounts, is the authority of common sense. Ordinary beliefs, such as the existence of a material world, the persistence of personal identity, and the reality of other minds, are treated as basic principles that any philosophy must respect. Reid contends that skepticism, which undermines these primary convictions, is self-defeating because it relies on the very mental faculties whose reliability it calls into question.
Cousin highlights Reid's methodological insistence that philosophy should begin with those spontaneous convictions that are essential to practical life. Rather than building metaphysics from abstruse hypotheses, Reid proposes to analyze mental faculties and trust their deliverances unless there is decisive reason not to. This yields a practical realism that privileges immediate perception and common experience over abstruse speculative doubt.

Epistemology and Perception
A core focus is Reid's theory of perception, which Cousin interprets as direct realism. Sensations are not private images from which the mind must infer external objects; instead, perception is an immediate relation in which the mind is directly aware of external things. Reid rejects the "veil of perception" model and the idea that belief in the external world must be inferred from ideas, arguing that such inference would render knowledge impracticable.
Cousin also outlines Reid's critique of associationist and idealist accounts that trace belief to passive impressions. Reid attributes knowledge to active mental powers: natural instincts, faculties, and principles that produce belief without reasoning. This faculty-centered epistemology makes knowledge secure because it is rooted in human constitution rather than in contingent chains of deduction.

Psychology, Morality, and Religion
Cousin gives substantial attention to Reid's "faculty psychology," which classifies perception, memory, attention, and the moral sense as distinct capacities with characteristic laws. Reid's moral psychology introduces conscience and a moral faculty that perceives obligations directly, thus grounding ethics in human nature rather than abstract calculation. Free will and responsibility also receive emphasis, as Reid defends moral agency against deterministic readings.
Religiously, Reid's realism supports belief in providence and divine truths by treating religious convictions as compatible with the natural light of reason. Cousin notes Reid's use of common-sense principles to counter atheistic or skeptical inferences, while avoiding crude fideism; moral and religious beliefs remain amenable to rational reflection yet retain their foundational status in practical life.

Cousin's Evaluation and Legacy
Cousin admires Reid for returning philosophy to the concerns of everyday moral and cognitive life, and for providing a clear antidote to destructive skepticism. He praises Reid's psychological acuity and his capacity to render abstruse problems tractable by appealing to human nature. Reid's style and method are credited with making philosophy useful again to ordinary thought and to religious and moral practice.
At the same time, Cousin registers certain limitations: Reid's reliance on common sense can seem to lack metaphysical depth or systematic proof, and his refusal to elaborate foundations beyond immediate convictions leaves some theoretical questions open. Nevertheless, Cousin views Reid as a crucial figure whose practical realism influenced later debates in epistemology, ethics, and the philosophy of mind, securing a durable place for common-sense philosophy in the modern tradition.